| Home » Site Map » [ Complexity | Eurasia | Europe | I.R. Theory ] » This document |
| Academic | Consulting | Contact | Eurasia blog | New on site | Site map |
Abstract:Contents:
The history of modern international relations is composed of a succession of international orders. Each international order comprises a succession of international systems. Three orders are distinguished since 1648. Two regularities are observed: the length of an international transition is about one-quarter the length of the international system it succeeds, and the last system of each order is split into two "moments" by an interim mini-transition about one-quarter the length of the first moment. Of those two moments, the second contains the seeds of the normative essence of the succeeding international order. Categorical reasoning about the historical record since 1648, using such structural concepts as unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, allows the most likely evolution of the international system to be systematically deduced. A new period of system transformation is projected to begin in the early 2040s and last about 10 years. Its likely principal actors and their relations are discussed. This peer-refereed journal article, also reprinted in an edited volume, is available below in full text.
Suggested citation for this webpage:
Robert M. Cutler,"The Complex Evolution of International Orders and the Current International Transition," Interjournal Complex Systems, No. 255 (1999); reprinted in Unifying Themes in Complex Systems, ed. Y. Bar-Yam and A. Minai (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 515–522; available at <http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar00ij.html>, accessed 14 November 2024.
The history of modern international relations is composed of a succession of international orders. Each international order comprises a succession of international systems. The last international system of one international order is also, as a transitional phenomenon, the first international system of the next international order. The systems composing any order are all based upon the same norms, but they may manifest different structural configurations. These structures are animated by coordinative and collaborative tendencies [Stein 1982] that may or may not survive, contributing to the definition of the succeeding system. Notwithstanding March/Olsen's [1998] assertion of the "small−N" problem, inferences are possible about the logic of succession of international systems and orders. Categorical reasoning, using such structural concepts as unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity [Kaplan 1966], is the vehicle for motivating generalizations that permit inferences on what we may expect in the twenty-first century.
The Treaty of Westphalia effectively ended the Counter-Reformation, but it only codified changes in international law and practice that had been evolving for some time before [Krasner 1993]. Although the norms to which we usually refer as "Westphalian" were codified in 1648, there was no structurally unified state "system" even at that time. Rather, there were various geographically delimited systems, each pursuing its own dynamic in response to the interests and behavior of more or less local powers, but without reference to geographically more distant states in other regions which participated in separate systems. It is nevertheless possible to define a previous order, beginning from the early fifteenth-century Council of Constance, with which the analysis here presented is consistent [Figgis 1907]. However, length constraints on the present chapter do not permit its elaboration.
In ordinary language, the order inaugurated by the transitional system that lasted from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Utrecht is frequently called the "Westphalian order." However, for present purposes it is more appropriate to refer to it as the Crowned Society Order, referring to its dominance by the royal sovereigns and the monarchist principle. This international order comprises three international systems.
The first Crowned Society system after Utrecht lasted until the launch of the democratic wars by the French Revolution in the early 1790s. (It is convenient to date the end of this system at 1794, the year of Robespierre's fall.) Collaboration was most evident through the Holy Alliance, implemented through family relations, economic ties, and a common domination of the ideological discourse. This was basically a unipolar, Franco-centric system. The successor system took shape with the definitive defeat of Napoleon and the convocation of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The transitional period from 1794 to 1815 was characterized by coordination through the institutionalization of common norms of self-preservation in the Powers. Their numerous alliances against Napoleon were thus transformed afterwards.
The second Crowned Society system was the Concert of Europe, from 1815 until the mid-1850s. It broke up over the Crimean War, and specifically over the British decision to back Turkey against Russia. The resulting decline and chaos were resolved only with the unification of the German states, beginning in 1866. The second transition thus lasted from the mid-1850s until the mid- to late 1860s when it saw the emergence of the German State which would dominate the subsequent system.
The third Crowned Society system stretched from the late 1860s to the First World War. It oscillated between Bismarck-centered unipolarity and generalized multipolarity, finally breaking down into bipolarity after a mini-transition lasting from 1890 to 1894. This mini-transition separates "Bismarckian" from the "post-Bismarckian" moment within this single international system. The coordinative aspects of the Bismarckian moment of this system (from the late 1860s to 1890) repose in the policies of reversals of alliances in the search for the resolution of the security dilemma. Its collaborative aspects are in the collaboration between the industrialists (and, variously, sometimes the aristocracy) plus the military within each state; and in the collaboration, at least implicit, among states at the level of their military apparatuses and the headquarters of these.
The second (post-Bismarckian) moment lasted from 1894 until 1914. The coordinative aspects of the post-Bismarckian moment of this third, Crowned Society system are represented by collective security. These carried over after the end of the First World War, to animate the concert of the victorious Powers against the vanquished, in the League of Nations. The collaborative aspects of the post-Bismarckian moment of the third Crowned Society system (and its subsequent transition) are those of the Holy Alliance, under another guise: after the First World War, they were transformed into a coalition of industrialized republics to the exclusion of Germany and the Soviet Union.
The breakdown of the Crowned Society order into bipolarity in the two decades preceding the First World War prefigured the bipolarity of the "International Society" order. The latter began in the early 1920s, marked notably by the beginning of the end of the British Empire through the London Conference of 1925. It is unclear whether the present international transition, which began in 1989/1991, marks the end of the International Society order (the "Short Twentieth Century") or the transition to another international system within that order (the "Long Twentieth Century"). If the former, then we are entering a new order that will be characterized by a tension between unipolarity and multipolarity over time across its constituent systems; if the latter, then we are entering another mainly bipolar international system within the same order.
The first international system of the ("International Society") Twentieth Century order—whether Long or Short—is the Interwar System from the early 1920s to 1941. The coordinative aspects of the system are represented in the military coalition against the Axis powers. The collaborative aspects emerge in the creation of the U.N. on the basis of the League of Nations, plus an ideological collaboration on two sides.
The second international system of the ("International Society") Twentieth Century order—whether Long or Short—is the Cold War system, from 1946/47 to 1991. It is possible that the years 1974/75–1979/80 mark a mini-transition between the two moments of the Cold War system. (Their significance is that they mark the decline and fall of Soviet–American détente, from Angola to Afghanistan. The biennium 1973/74 also marks the oil embargo that irrevocably changed post-1945 international politics and economics.) If so, then the years 1946/47–1973/74 represent system's the Tight Bipolar moment, and the years 1979/80–1991 represent its Loose Bipolar moment.
Such a mini-transition, and the years following, are susceptible to two interpretations. They may introduce a new international order, as did years 1894–1914 after the mini-transition within the third international system of the Crowned Society order. If this is so, then just as unipolar/multipolar tension degenerated into bipolarity, we may suppose that Cold War bipolarity "degenerated" into what may be called Multilateral Interdependence towards the end of the twentieth century. In this case, the coordinative and/or collaborative aspects of Multilateral Independence are what will carry over into the next international order, which we may call the "World Society" order.
Regularities are evident from the foregoing analytical review of the succession of international orders and international systems within those orders. The first Crowned Society system lasted 81 years and was followed by a transition of 21 years. The second Crowned Society system lasted 39 years and was followed by a transition of 12 years. The third Crowned Society system lasted about 48 years, divided into two moments of equal length by an interim mini-transition of four years, and was followed by a transition of 11 years. The first Twentieth Century system lasted 16 years and was followed by a transition of five years. The second Twentieth Century system lasted 45 years, divided into two moments of unequal length by an interim mini-transition lasting four years.
Two regularities may be observed. The first is that the length of an international transition is roughly one-quarter the length of the international system it succeeds. On this basis, it is possible to conclude that the present international transition, which started in 1991, will end during the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
The second regularity is that the last international system of each international order is split into two "moments" by an interim mini-transition that is about one-quarter the length of the first moment. Of those two "moments," the second contains the seeds of the normative essence of the succeeding international order.
The further significance of these generalizations will become clear from a discussion of the differing analytical significance of the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in East Central Europe versus the abolition of the Soviet Union itself.
The Crowned Society order is characterized by the "classical" balance of power [Gulick 1955]. The principal characteristic of the Crowned Society order is thus the tension between unipolarity and multipolarity, and moreover the frequent shifting of alliances depending upon the exigencies of the moment. The breakdown of the tension between German unipolarity generalized multipolarity into bipolarity, after a mini-transition lasting from 1890 to 1894, heralded the end of this order.
The International Society order is characterized by bipolarity: between the status quo and revisionist powers under the Interwar System, before the Second World War; and between the two superpowers and their blocs under the Cold War system, after the Second World War. However, as described above, it may be conceived that the Cold War system of the International Society order is, like the last international system of the Crowned Society order, divided into two moments by the second half of the 1970s.
If the years afterwards, up until the end of the Cold War system in 1991, are designated to be a separate and multilateral "moment" of that system—say, for example, the Multilateral Interdependence moment—then this represents the breakdown of Short Twentieth Century bipolarity and the transition to a new international order—let us call it the World Society order—that will be characterized by the tension between multipolarity and unipolarity. However, if the current international transition, which began in 1991, inaugurates only another bilateral system, then there is no new international order and only a Long Twentieth Century.
The Concert of Europe hid an ideological (normative) opposition between the republican and monarchical principles. This later animated, without determining in all its details, the principal structural basis for the geopolitical bipolarization that led to the First World War. If a similar pattern is followed today, then the contemporary postmodernization of the Enlightenment will become the basis for a system-wide ideological bipolarization that will in turn, after the middle of the twenty-first century, relegate the now-emerging multipolarity to secondary status as a characteristic of the system as a whole.
Some have argued, for example, that the United States seems to be adapting newly proposed international norms—e.g., "the law of humanitarian intervention in civil conflict"—to its own particular influence-projection interests. Chechnya and Tatarstan in Russia, and Tibet and Uighuristan (Xinjiang) in China, provide domestic political-control explanations why Russia and China oppose this new norm. To oppose a new normative basis is to seek to conserve the old one, which is expressed through the bipolarity of the Twentieth Century order. We would then have the interesting development, at first glance paradoxical, of the status quo power in the new system—the United States—becoming the innovator of norms for that international order.
So what about the emerging "World Society" international order, if there is one? By previous reasoning, its first international system would be characterized by a tension between multipolarity and unipolarity. The consensus of a wide variety of "long-cycle" and "world-systems" research in political science, all with different assumptions, that a system-wide struggle over the structure of the international system will occur—whether peaceful or not—around 2030–2050, supports this analysis [Denemark 1999]. The next section reveals that, under closer examination, a transformed bipolar structure may also be maintained, with at least one of the poles being an emerging international actor not yet evident on the world stage.
The key to understanding the nature of the current international transition is to distinguish between what happened in 1989 (the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in East Central Europe) and what happened in 1991 (the abolition of the Soviet Union). These separate events motivate mutually distinct interpretations of the nature of the current international transition. The 1989 events mark the end of what we may call a Short Twentieth Century. Under this interpretation, the current international transition is a transition to a normatively new international order that will manifest as a succession of international systems, all animated by the tension between unipolarity and multipolarity. The 1991 events, on the other hand, mark the end of current transition as a bridge to another bipolar system within an always bipolar Long Twentieth Century.
If 1989 marks the end of the International Society order (as the Short Twentieth Century), then it means the end of bipolarity as an organizing principle of the international order. That in turn would mean that the bipolarity of the Cold War was not European in its origin. Rather, under this hypothesis, the division of Europe by the Cold War manifested something more fundamental, viz., the projection into Europe of the ideological and great-power confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union also to be found in the developing world. This ideological conflict began to disappear even before 1989 with the doctrinal innovations introduced by Gorbachev.
From this perspective, we have today a unipolar, U.S.–centered transition to a multipolar system. If the unipolar transition initiated by Bismarck in 1866 is taken as a model, leading to the multipolar system that ended resolved into a bipolar conflict between opposing blocs before culminating in war in 1914, then we might explore the hypothesis that the multipolar system to which the current unipolar transition may lead, will likewise resolve into a bipolar conflict between blocs.
Under this interpretation, the unification of Germany under Bismarck appears as a nineteenth-century European-level analogue to today's global-level unification of an extended "Atlantic Civilization" (pan–Europe and North America) under NATO and the European Union as a joint framework. However, the analogy goes still deeper. Following Bismarck's passage from the scene in 1890, the international structure reverted to an "updated" Holy Alliance in the form of the Three Emperors' League. Analogously, we have today a reversion to an "updated" NATO through the adjoinment of the Partnership for Peace.
Moreover, the East European former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are now nearly all members of NATO, ready to become NATO members or de facto NATO protectorates (e.g., Albania and the successors to Yugoslavia). If the superstructure of the Holy Alliance was an ineffectual Quadruple Alliance, today an ineffectual OSCE stands as superstructure to the new NATO/EU composite framework. This reasoning motivates the inference that the current international transition is a transition to a new international order, and not just to a new system within an existing order. If that is the case, then historical logic compels the conclusion that this order should be characterized by a succession of international systems animated by the tension between unipolarity and multipolarity. Under such a conclusion, the unipolar Power is the United States. Historical logic likewise compels the conclusion that this tension between unipolarity and multipolarity will ultimately resolve into a bipolar conflict between opposing blocs. One of these will be the composite NATO/EU bloc on a global geostrategic level.
It is possible that the years 1979/80–1991 (representing the Loose Bipolar moment of the second International Society system) do not catalyze a fundamental change in the International Society order's bipolar dynamic, which is merely transformed. The sense in which a new bipolarity comes from 1991, arises from the contemporary turning of Russian public opinion against the West, and of its political elites towards Asia.
Here, too, there is an historical parallel. After losing Crimea in the mid-nineteenth century, Russia turned its attention to Poland, the Pacific coast (now meaning and including China as well as Japan) plus south and southwest Asia, and the Balkans. That is the same pattern as today, with Poland being replaced by Poland/Lithuania/Baltics. The orientations are regionalized but the patterns are the same. This reversion to an old pattern creates the basis for continued bipolarity in Europe, if we recall that geographers have always defined Europe as extending to the Urals. Current tendencies in Russian foreign policy therefore provide a foothold on the Continent for a geopolitical pole opposing Euro–Atlantic community on the global scale.
The present paper reveals that over recent centuries, the geometric mean of the lifetime of any international system is 40 years, and that the length of the international transition following the death of any international system is about one-quarter the length of that system's lifetime. This finding would project a new realignment to take place towards the middle of the twenty-first century [Denemark 1999].
Complexity science dictates the need for multi-scale analysis. It therefore offers the insight that both the 1989-based and the 1991-based interpretations may be simultaneously valid, because it posits that the realities represented by these interpretations are not coterminous but instead interact and intersect at multiple levels. Coemergent multiple realities are natural to complex systems.
Without necessarily endorsing Huntington's [1996] "clash of civilizations" thesis, it is possible to uphold the idea that one geopolitical/geocultural bloc now consolidating itself is Euro–Atlantic. In historical perspective, this could even be called the Renaissance/Enlightenment bloc. The strongest candidate at present to play the role of counterweight is an Asian bloc. Rising Asian powers have already offered an "Asian model" of political and economic development. This "Asian model" may have an Islamic cultural-normative component, yet without Islamic scholars' preservation of ancient Greek texts in translation, there would have been no Renaissance. Indeed, a non-Islamic Asian (e.g., Chinese) model is also possible.
Such a now-emergent mesolevel Asiatic geocultural unification could be the catalyst, in the middle of the twenty-first century, for a system-wide restructuring that would eventually reduce the now-emerging multipolarity into a more bipolar framework. In fact, this unification need not even be political like Bismarck's of Germany: it may be transnational, particularly insofar as all these trends really cross-cut through individual societies. If the major blocs in the twenty-first century will be geocultural, then the centrality of Central and Southwest Asia becomes evident. The significance of Iran is especially heightened. Uzbekistan emerges as a potential a flash-point in the early twenty-first century, probably around 2020–2025, principally for demographic and economic reasons [Spruyt 1994]. That may be the spark that leads to the more general realignment—i.e., period of system transformation—that other work projects for 2030–2050. This work independently places that realignment to begin in the early 2040s and estimates its duration at 10 years, in conformance with the "one-quarter rule."
Denemark, R.A., 1999, World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations, in International Studies Review, Blackwell (Malden), 1, 2.
Figgis, J.N., 1907, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414–1625, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge).
Gulick, E.V., 1955, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, Cornell University Press (Ithaca).
Huntington, S.P., 1996, The Clash of Civilizations, Simon & Schuster (New York).
Kaplan, M.A., 1966. Some Problems of International Systems Research, in International Political Communities: An Anthology, Doubleday & Co. (New York).
Krasner, S., 1993, Westphalia and All That, in Ideas and Foreign Policy, edited by J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane, Cornell University Press (Ithaca).
March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P., 1998, The Institutional Dynamics of International Orders, in International Organization, MIT Press (Cambridge), 52, 4.
Spruyt, H., 1994, The Sovereign State and its Competitors, Princeton University Press (Princeton).
Stein, A., 1982, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in International Organization, MIT Press (Cambridge), 36, 2.
Dr. Robert M. Cutler [ website — email ] was educated at MIT and The University of Michigan, where he earned a Ph.D. in Political Science, and has specialized and consulted in the international affairs of Europe, Russia, and Eurasia since the late 1970s. He has held research and teaching positions at major universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia, and contributed to leading policy reviews and academic journals as well as the print and electronic mass media in three languages.
| Academic | Consulting | Contact | Eurasia blog | New on site | Site map |
| Home » Site Map » [ Complexity | Eurasia | Europe | I.R. Theory ] » This document |
Text: Copyright © Robert M. Cutler
First Web-published: 22 December 1998
Content last modified: 29 September 2000
For individual, non-commerical use only.
This Web-based compilation: Copyright © Robert M. Cutler
See reprint info
if you want to reproduce anything in any medium.
This document address (URL): http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ar00ij.html
Format last tweaked: 23 October 2014
You accessed this page: 14 November 2024