The European Parliament and the European Union Security and Defence Policy

Robert M. Cutler
Alexander von Lingen

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The European Parliament and the European Union Security and Defence Policy

This article treats the evolution of the participation of the European Parliament (EP) in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and prospects for its participation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[1] It begins with a review of the EP’s history from the perspective of comparison with other international parliamentary institutions (IPIs), and its increasing role in EC/EU affairs, including foreign affairs. The second part of the article treats the EP’s place and role in the formation and execution of the CFSP, while the third part follows with an analogous treatment of its place and role in the ESDP. The fourth part reviews the CFSP/ESDP in action and its future, particularly from the perspective of the EP’s implication in it. The conclusion offers a few remarks about the EP in historical perspective, and also about its future, insofar as the Convention on the Future of Europe and provisional draft Constitution produced by the latter are concerned.

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1. The EU and the EP in Comparative International Perspective

The political system of the EU is frequently depicted as a single institutional framework (Articles 3–7) having three ‘pillars’, these being the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). However, this did not happen overnight. Following the signing of the Treaties of Rome, European construction focussed on economic aspects, i.e. the creation of a common market, although ideas for co-operation in the field of international policy were already in evidence. For almost forty years of European construction the very expression ‘common foreign policy’ found no place in the Treaties.

At the Hague Summit of 2 December 1969, the Heads of State and Government of the then six Member States instructed their Foreign Ministers to look into the possibilities for progress towards political union. Their deliberations resulted in the development of European Political Co-operation (EPC), a form of co-operation between sovereign states involving mutual information and consultation, the harmonization of views and concerted diplomacy, rather than a real common policy. From October 1970 the Member States of the European Community co-operated and endeavoured to consult one another on major international policy problems. However, this was at intergovernmental level in the EPC context. EPC began, and always remained, outside the Community framework, and operated mainly within the Council of Ministers, set up in part for this purpose in 1974. The procedure remained informal and pragmatic until it was codified and institutionalized by the Single European Act, signed in 1986 but without changing its nature or methods of operation. The CFSP inherited much of the intergovernmental character of EPC.[2]

The Maastricht Treaty continued this approach, distinguishing the CFSP, in the second pillar, from Community policies, which form the first and main pillar of the Treaty. In spite of this tripartism, Member States incorporated the objective of a ‘common foreign policy’ for the first time in the Treaty, moving beyond EPC in a number of areas. After the Treaty’s entry into force on 1 November 1993, the European Union as such could make its voice heard on the international stage, express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and any other subject linked to the fundamental principles and common values which form the basis of the European Union and which it is committed to defend. In addition to strengthened co-operation, the Treaty established new instruments: common positions (Article 12) and common actions (Article 13), which aimed to encourage the emergence of common principles, possibly with operational provisions to put the principles into practice. In

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the context of the TEU, joint actions were the main policy instrument. They are more ambitious than common positions and require increased discipline from the Member States. However, declarations remain the instrument most frequently used by the Council.[3]

To see these most recent developments in their proper perspective, it is instructive to elaborate a chronological concordance of the institutional development of the EC/EU on the one hand and the EP on the other hand. Table 1 provides such a perspective. The remainder of this section briefly explicates it. The taxonomy of IPIs was established through an exhaustive survey of such organizations existing in the world today.[4] It has four Phases, called ‘Congress’, ‘Assembly’, ‘Parliament’ and ‘Legislature’, all given initial capital letters to signify that these terms refer to specific analytically defined stages of institutional development and are not be confused with the names that IPIs may give themselves, or with any ordinary-language connotations of the terms.

There is a very familiar way to look at this potential institutional development. The Congress Phase is like the classical political-science category of non-associational interest group. Specifically, it refers to the membership of a potential future IPI as a categorical group, whether geographically or otherwise defined. (Prior to the stage, there is no such group at all: in the classical typology, an ‘anomic’ group.) The Assembly Phase is like an associational group. The Parliament Phase and Legislature Phase are both as like institutional groups, and they are in that sense also corporatist formations as the world-societal level. The difference between them is that a Legislature has international juridical autonomy. These phases in the development of an IPI represent only a genetic blueprint. Many IPIs do not attain the fullest degree of development in this quadripartite taxonomy, and the statutes of some bar them from progressing beyond a given stage. It is instructive to schematize the development of the EP in these terms.

Phase 1: Pre-Congress Event and Congress Phase. As the Latin etymon of ‘Congress’ means ‘to come together’, we may say analytically that when various national parliaments or members thereof ‘come together’ in a meeting for the first time, this is a Congress. The Pre-Congress Event later giving rise to the EP’s development is the first meeting of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in September 1952. However, one meeting does not make an institution. The inaugural March 1957 meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly represents transition into the Congress Phase and, quickly followed by the institutionalization of informational activities and normative activities, it sparked the initiation stage of institutional development.

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Phase 2: Assembly Phase. Etymologically the word ‘Assembly’ signifies ‘going together’. As such, it is not merely gathering such as is a Congress. Rather, it is an acknowledgment by those who assemble together, of their common existential status which, in the human world where like seeks like, motivates the repetition of the exercise of assembling, of which the Congress was the first instance. An ‘Assembly’ can function quite well with the relatively limited secretariat that may have evolved from its first meeting as a Congress. The EP, having acquired this secretariat and a nominal international juridical personality, reached the Assembly Phase of institutional development by 1958. It then moved swiftly into the first stage of takeoff by moving to institute rule-creation and rule-supervisory activities respecting its own functioning. However, it encountered significant resistance in seeking to implement such activities regarding other integration institutions.

Phase 3: Parliament Phase. The jolt necessary to break the logjam inhibiting the EP’s further institutional development, permitting the second stage of takeoff to begin, came with the anticipation of the first wave of enlargement. In 1970 the EP achieved regular consultation with the Member States concerning budgetary matters, and a new equilibrium began to emerge between the EP and its institutional environment within the EC/EU. The Treaty of Rome provided for EP oversight of the organization’s executive, but this did not effectively occur until after the first direct election (June 1979). The EP’s successful assertion of this oversight (rule-supervisory) function marks analytically its having reached the Parliament Phase of institutional development. Note that the fundamental etymological root of the word ‘Parliament’ signifies ‘a place where there is talk’. Historically, a national parliament need not enjoy the right, obligation, possibility or even power to propose laws, let alone discuss, ratify, or enforce them.

Phase 4: Legislature Phase. The stage of spillover includes especially the ‘internal function’ of operational activities, which here specifically refers not only to the EP’s relations with external bodies but also to its participation in Europe’s foreign affairs. The EP began to participate in an operational way following the elaboration of the CFSP in 1983. Following upon that spillover, the EP finally emerged into the Legislature Phase of institutional development when it attained authority over other EC/EU bodies following the 1986 signing of the Single European Act, which, in particular, improved procedures and introduced regular legislative co-operation between the EP

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and the European Council. (Etymologically, ‘Legislature’ means not to make laws but, literally, to ‘carry’ laws. Under the Roman Republic, the Senate legislated when it took a law that it had approved and carried it to—i.e., placed it before—the people in the Forum for their adoption or rejection. Consequently, to be a ‘Legislature’ in the technical sense here adopted, does not mean to make laws per se, but rather to have some domestic or international juridical authority—such as ‘co-decision’—for deliberating over laws, proposing them to some executive, and implementing them if adopted.) Since the Single European Act, the EP has also acquired certain functions with respect to CFSP/ESDP.

2. The European Parliament and the CFSP

During the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, the EP called for the CFSP to be incorporated into the Community structure, insofar as CFSP’s efficiency and consistency are limited by the three-pillar division. (The EP also proposed that the EU be given international legal personality, to enable it to act as a legal entity, and that the use of qualified majority voting become the norm.) In a resolution of 28 May 1998, the EP noted that, although the full implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty should improve the situation, nevertheless the CFSP as it currently exists limits Europe’s ability to have the influence proportional to its political, economic and cultural weight; that there remained a mismatch between the EU’s foreign policy and its trading activities; and that it is therefore essential to create, as a matter of urgency, a genuine European diplomacy, transforming the Commission representations into proper diplomatic representations of the Union in countries where the majority of Member States are not fully represented.

Articles 11 to 28 in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) form the basis of the CFSP. The other provisions in the TEU also indirectly concerning the CFSP are: Title I (the common provisions), especially Articles 2 and 3 (b and c); the final provisions of Title VIII (VII); the protocol on Article 17, annexed to the Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam; declarations 27 through 30 adopted by the 1990 IGC (Maastricht Treaty); and five declarations on the CFSP adopted by the 1996 IGC (Amsterdam Treaty), in particular Nº 2 on enhanced co-operation between the EU and the WEU, Nº 3 on the WEU, Nº 4 on Articles 24 and 38, Nº 5 on Article 25, and Nº 6 on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit. In the EC Treaty, Articles 296, 297, 300 and 301 are also pertinent as the legal basis for the CFSP.

The five specific objectives of the CFSP, as set out in Article 11(1) of the TEU are: (1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union, extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam to

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include the integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter; (2) to strengthen the security of the Union [and its Member States] in all ways; (3) to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter; (4) to promote international co-operation; and (5) to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.[5] Unlike EPC, the CFSP involves the full participation of the Community institutions. As such, it has been marked by initiatives to create a single institutional framework for the sake of greater coherence as well as by the inclusion of security and defence issues. Opinions vary concerning the success of these efforts. However, it is useful to set out seven measures in that direction, following from the Treaty of Amsterdam.[6] These are:

1. The incorporation of the Petersburg tasks. Under Article 17(4), the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated into the TEU the so-called Petersburg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. They became part of the CFSP and the common defence policy. All of the Union’s Member States may participate in these tasks.
2. Identifying the role of the Commission. The Commission implements the CFSP budget, which is part of the EC budget, and under Article 18(4) it is fully associated with the work carried out in the field of CFSP. As may any Member State, so too may the Commission refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and submit proposals to the Council. Likewise, it may request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting and make suggestions to the policy planning unit for work to be undertaken.
3. The introduction of new CFSP bodies. The Amsterdam Treaty introduces the new office of a High Representative (HR) for CFSP. He or she will also be the Council Secretary General. Under Article 26, the HR shall assist the Council in the field of CFSP with the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, with conducting political dialogue with third countries. Mr Javier Solana was appointed as the first HR and took office on 18 October 1999.
4. The decision-making process and the introduction of new CFSP policy aspects. Paragraph 1 of Article 23 establishes the general rule that on CFSP matters, decisions should be taken by unanimity. This need for unanimity remains a main feature of the extremely complex and also inflexible decision-making process. But the Amsterdam Treaty allows

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for a procedure of ‘constructive abstention’, by which a Member State couples its abstention with a formal declaration and is, in consequence, not obliged to apply a particular decision while not preventing its adoption. It also provides for the Council to act by ‘qualified majority’ when adopting joint actions or common positions, or taking any other decision on the basis of a Common Strategy (which sets out the aims and length of time covered and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States, and is adopted at the level of the Council); and when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position (unless a member of the Council declares its opposition beforehand to the taking of a decision by qualified majority). In the latter instance, the Council acting by a qualified majority may request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

5. The policy planning and early warning unit. The unit is part of the General Secretariat of the Council, and is under the responsibility of its Secretary-General, High Representative for the CFSP. The tasks of the unit include the following: monitoring and analysing developments in areas relating to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests; providing early warning in crisis situations and contributing to policy formation in the Council by means of analyses, recommendations and strategies.
6. Financing. Article 28 states that administrative expenditure shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities as non-compulsory expenditure. This is also the case for operational expenditure, except for that relating to operations with military or defence implications and when the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. In these cases of exception, expenditure is charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. The Community budgetary procedure applies to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities. An inter-institutional agreement on all of these points was concluded on 16 July 1997 amongst the EP, the Council and the Commission.
7. Implementation. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 welcomed the arrival in office of Mr Javier Solana as HR for the CFSP. It also invited the Council, on the basis of input from the HR and the Commission, to ensure that optimum use is made of all the means at the Union’s disposal for more effective and comprehensive external action. Although the European Council has issued several declarations on foreign policy issues, implementation of the CFSP has tended to concentrate on common security and defence policy.

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, there are four different types of

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legislative procedures (and Parliament’s involvement): assent, consultation, co-operation, and co-decision. The EP bodies dealing with external relations and CFSP/ESDP, and the modalities of their activities, are:

• President (representation, visits and contacts)
• Bureau (one Vice-president responsible)
• Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (hearings, conferences, meetings, visits)
• Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy
• Thirteen Joint Parliamentary Committees (each bilateral with one of thirteen associated candidate countries)
• Four Parliamentary Co-operation Committees (with nine CIS countries)
• Parliamentary Delegations (to other countries including Canada, Unites States, Japan, etc.)
• Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
• Relations with interparliamentary assemblies or other international parliamentary in stitutions (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, etc.)
• Relations between the political groups and corresponding parties abroad
• Observation of elections in third countries

Article 21 still provides only for a consultative role for the European Parliament in the CFSP/ESDP. The Presidency of the Council consults Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of these policies, ensuring that the latter’s views are taken duly into consideration. The Presidency and the Commission must keep the EP regularly informed of the development of the CFSP.[7] The EP may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it, and holds an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

3. Elaboration of the European Security and Defence Policy

3.1. Post-Amsterdam through the Year 2000

Despite the fact the security and defence policy remain mostly within the purview of the executive, the question of EP participation in the CFSP as well as in ESDP becomes today a key matter in the actual construction of Europe. This is so, because the boundary between the issue areas of EU enlargement on the one hand, and, on the other hand, security and defence, is itself no longer so well defined as it once was. We therefore turn now to that question. It is most efficient, following on the presentation in the previous section, to

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set out the main milestones of ESDP development likewise.

At the Cologne European Council of June 1999, as a result of the Kosovo conflict, the EU took a major step towards establishing its own military capabilities and placed crisis management tasks at the core of the process of strengthening the ESDP. (These are also known as the Petersburg tasks, so named after the place where the WEU Ministerial Council that formulated them was held in June 1992. They are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.) The aim was to create capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, and the readiness to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. Even though the Cologne declaration was only an interim one, it marked a fundamental change of direction. Those functions that the WEU assumed in the field of Petersburg tasks are now included in the EU.[8]

Successive European Councils gradually gave substance to this desire for the Union to achieve a capacity for autonomous action in international crisis management. This would take place where NATO as such is not engaged, and in compliance with the principles of the UN Charter, acknowledging the prerogatives of the UN Security Council. Thus, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 set the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. For the Union this meant being able, by the year 2003, to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 60,000 persons capable of carrying out the full range of Petersburg tasks. The achievement of this goal does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment and deployment of national troops is based on sovereign decisions taken by Member States.[9] The mission of this new force, the European Rapid Reaction Force, would include humanitarian rescue operations, the prevention of armed conflict, or even full-scale intervention to separate fighting parties. The recent deployment of the French-led peacekeeping mission ‘Operation Artemis’ to Bunia, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, is correctly considered the first such mission.

At the Feira European Council of June 2000, the EU formally endorsed the establishment of its interim Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of national representatives dealing with all aspects of CFSP, including ESDP. It also established its interim EU Military Committee (EMC), composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military delegates, which will give advice and make recommendations to the PSC. EU Military Staff, within the European Council structures, will provide military expertise and support to the ESDP, including the conduct of EU–led military crisis management operations. The Feira Council also created a European Security and Intelligence Force (ESIF), which will consist of 5,000

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well-armed police, able to carry out actions in support of global peacekeeping missions. This force will be under the control of the PSC, whilst effective operational control will be in the hands of the HR. It will require a pool of more than 15,000 men committed and trained for service with the ESIF.

The Member States took part in the Brussels Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. These commitments have been set out in a document known as the ‘Force Catalogue’. In accordance previously established guidelines, the Member States also committed themselves to medium- and long-term efforts so as to improve both their operational and their strategic capabilities. They further committed themselves—particularly in connection with reforms being implemented in their own armed forces—to continue steps to strengthen their own capabilities and carry out existing or planned projects implementing multinational solutions, including the pooling of resources. Also, a number of areas were identified for upgrading existing assets, investment, development and co-ordination. This would gradually or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action.

3.2. The Nice Treaty, Enlargement and the Draft Constitution[10]

The Nice European Council of December 2000 took the decision to establish the aforementioned PSC and EMC within the Council. Further, the Council Secretariat now incorporates a military staff composed of military experts seconded by the Member States under the military direction of the EMC, which it is to assist. The Union has also defined arrangements for the possible participation of third countries (European Member States of NATO which are not part of the Union and other candidate countries for accession to the Union) and other potential partners in EU military crisis management. In addition, permanent arrangements have been agreed for EU–NATO consultation and co-operation. Meetings between the EU and NATO are held on a regular basis in certain specific fields with a view to enabling the former, where necessary, to launch operations, using NATO assets and capabilities (notably planning capabilities and command options). In the meantime, preparation of a programme of exercises to test the crisis management structures and assets and work out procedures is well under way. This group of measures is called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The Laeken European Council of December 2001 decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. This reflects the

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Union’s consistent overall approach to crisis management, enabling it further to develop the range of civilian instruments already at its disposal (for the most part under the Commission’s responsibility), whilst also being able to use military force.

The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, also contains new CFSP provisions. It introduces the concept of ‘enhanced co-operation’. This may be established by several Member States in a position to do so (at least eight) where the objectives of the Union and the Community cannot be achieved by the Member States as a whole. As regards CFSP, this co- operation may limited to the implementation of a joint action or a common position, or broadened to the acquisition of crisis management capabilities through arms initiatives or security and defence initiatives. The Treaty of Nice replaces several Articles concerning CFSP, in particular Article 17 mentioning the WEU; and Article 24 now requiring a qualified majority of the Council, and only exceptionally unanimity when the agreement covers an issue for which unanimity is requested for the adoption of internal decisions. Finally, the new Articles 27a–27e introduce ‘enhanced co-operation’ in the area of CFSP regarding implementation of a joint action or a common position, but not with respect to matters having military or defence implications. Member States wishing to establish enhanced co-operation amongst themselves address their request to the Council, whence it is forwarded to the Commission for an opinion and to the EP for information. The Council decides by qualified majority, whilst the High Representative for the CFSP keeps the EP and all members of the Council fully informed about the implementation of enhanced co-operation in the field of CFSP.

4. Implementation and Effectiveness

4.1. CFSP/ESDP in Action

The agents of the CFSP are the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Secretary-General of the Council, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Deputy Secretary-General and the General Secretariat of the Council, the European Commission, the Member States, and the special representatives. Its instruments are common strategies (Article 13(2)), joint actions (Article 14(1)), common positions (Article 15), the conclusion of international agreements, declarations, and contacts with third countries.

The CFSP is mandated to be consistent with other policies and to have an efficient decision-making procedure. Consistency in the CFSP field is ensured under two headings. First, the Treaty on European Union provides a framework, resources, methods and patterns of work for implementing the CFSP,

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whilst keeping it within the single pre-existing institutional framework. The fact that the Commission is fully associated in discussions on the CFSP thus strengthens co-ordination. Second, the European Council sets out guidelines for the development of the Union and so ensures the consistency of the CFSP with Community policies conducted under the responsibility of the Commission, particularly external economic relations and development co-operation policy.

Concerning European foreign policy, it is felt that Europe should not act a ‘critical bystander’ in the newly emerging global security environment, but should rather become ‘partners in leadership’ with the United States. For this, the EU needs response instruments and capacities. The importance of Justice and Home Affairs in the fight against terrorism rises to equal that of military instruments.[11] Yet the EU needs, above all, mechanisms for better co-ordinating and increasing its policy cohesion and effectiveness, and especially strengthening such capacities as strategic lift, intelligence and precision guided missiles. It also needs special forces. The HR’s embodiment of the ‘one voice, one face’ for Europe should not be at the expense of the Commission; instead, the rotating presidency should delegate more power to the HR, who is already much better recognized and identified by the public. Since Turkey’s position in the war against terrorism and in the new geo-strategic field in general is pivotal, it needs further consideration in the policy arena of the EU’s international behaviour.

4.2. The EP and the Future of the CFSP/ESDP

An EP resolution of 13 April 2000, containing proposals for the 2000 Inter-Governmental Conference, gave priority to the security and defence aspects of CFSP, with a call for greater involvement of the Commission and the EP in the decision making process. The EP also proposed that the positions of High Representative for the CFSP and Commissioner responsible for External Relations should, in due course, be merged into a specially appointed Vice-President of the Commission. Later, in resolutions of 15 June 2000 and of 30 November 2000, the EP:

• declared that it welcomed the debate on European security and defence policy which began in Portschach in October 1998, as well as guidelines set out in the Cologne and Helsinki declarations, and noted the Member States determination to implement these two declarations;
• declared that it welcomed the progress made in the field of the ESDP at the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 and the Feira European Council of June 2000;
• declared that, in accordance with international law, there should be an appropriate mandate from the UN Security Council authorizing the use

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of military force, and that in the absence of a mandate as a result of a deadlock in the Security Council, the in ternational community, of which the EU is a part, should only be able to intervene militarily in urgent cases at the express request of the UN Secretary-General;

• proposed, in the context of the CFSP and the ESDP, regular meetings bringing together representatives of the competent committees of national parliaments and the EP, with a view to examining the development of the two policies jointly with the Council Presidency, the HR for CFSP and the Commissioner responsible for external relations; and
• placed great importance on co-operation between the EP and NATO Parliamentary Assembly.[12]

The ESDP has developed rapidly since then. As summarized above, the Member States have taken important decisions on it at the European summits. The involvement of the EP in CFSP and ESDP, as described in the European Union Treaty (Article 21), is limited. However, the ‘cross-pillar’ nature of crisis management, particularly in the light of the activities envisaged within the context of non-military crisis management, implies some involvement of the EP for those issues falling within its purview, such as humanitarian assistance. The EP will therefore play a role in some elements of crisis management, although its role in ESDP as such is limited.

The EP itself has come forward with proposals to set up a joint parliamentary committee. A resolution (Lalumiere Report) makes reference to a role by the COSAC, a regular meeting of the European Affairs committees from Member States’ parliaments and a delegation from the EP, which primarily concerns itself with first-pillar matters. This may provide a forum for developing ideas on the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP. In this context meetings could be held between the representatives of national parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence of Member States and applicant countries and a delegation from the EP committee on foreign affairs, human rights and common foreign and security policy.

5. Conclusion and Prospect

5.1. The EP’s Historical Significance

Historical antecedents to the family of types of IPIs, of which the EP is the most highly developed individual species, include the First and Second Continental Congresses of the British colonies in North America (late 18th century), the Iroquois Confederation in North America (ca. 14th–18th centuries), and the Landtage of the Holy Roman Empire in the Age of the Princes (13th–15th centuries). More distant historical precedents arguably include such Greek confederacies and leagues as the Peloponnesian and the

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Delian (6th–4th centuries BCE) and also the voting military-political assembly comitia centuriata under the Roman kings before the Servian reforms (8th–5th centuries BCE). In this perspective it may be noted that if, during the ancient Age of Empires, the first forebears of modern IPIs could well have been assembled armies constituted as political representatives of the peoples from whom they were levied, then the EP—surely the modern IPI par excellence—is only now participating in the reverse step, from the political representation of peoples to the formation of assembled military forces. (Of course, in the modern case, the MEPs are not themselves the combatants.)

The European Parliament, itself, was motivated and set into place by states working together within a nascent regional integration organization. The EP’s unique qualities derive from its origin as an European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) body. Its capacity to contribute to forcing the resignation of the Commission derives only from the desire of the national political elites who formed the ECSC to be able to oust the international administrative elite at its head. Indeed, the ECSC was itself unique because it was a manifestation of sectoral international integration, which subsequently became illegal under GATT rules. So the development of the EP to its present stage of responsibility is the result of very idiosyncratic factors.[13]

Today the EP is one of several dozen international parliamentary institutions and assemblies in world politics.[14] For example, the Baltic Assembly has formal powers to make recommendations to the governments of the three Baltic states, concerning a whole range of international policy. It also has authority to determine whether these recommendations are followed, although it has no formal powers of enforcement or punishment. The existence of the Baltic Council has ensured in practice a certain degree of effective oversight. Of course, in the run-up to the oncoming enlargement, the functions and activities of the Baltic Council are increasingly absorbed into other, larger bodies. Yet the Baltic Assembly is sui generis neither in its origins nor in its responsibilities: the Central American Parliament highly comparable.

The EP’s very uniqueness leads at least some IPIs, if not to seek to emulate it, then at least to transfer to their own region applicable lessons from the EP’s experience. In contrast with the EP template, however, other IPIs are often limited a priori in the possible scope of their responsibilities and authority. This effectively constitutes a brake upon any development of its international juridical personality beyond a certain degree. For example, most Latin American IPIs are unrelated to any international security organization, not even the Organization of American States. Yet the formation of many of them has been motivated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which impelled the concerned states to heighten their own regional integration.

Nevertheless, the EP’s unique experience lends itself as a template to other

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IPIs, in various phases of development, that may borrow such qualities as are useful. This is hardly to say that other IPIs will become ‘exactly’ like the EP: they cannot. If they are part of a regional integration organization, their evolution will depend also upon their relations with the executive of that organization as well as with its member-states and their national legislatures. Yet the EP has run through all the phases of growth enumerated at the beginning of this article: Congress, Assembly, Parliament, and Legislature. Perhaps it is accurate to say that there is no problem or task that any IPI in the world will confront, that does not have some direct analogy, if not identity, with the EP’s experience at some stage of its development.[15]

Putting the above discussion of the EP’s role in CFSP/ESDP into the developmental context set out at the beginning of this article, it becomes clear that the EP has gradually extended its competence and increased its powers over time. It has evolved from an appointed consultative ‘Common Assembly’ of the three European Communities (national deputies from the parliaments of the Member States) to a directly elected Parliament of the European Union as its co-legislative body and political actor. Especially significant turning points appear to be its acquisition of increasing budgetary competence throughout the 1970s (representing the second stage of takeoff) and co-decisional authority in home and foreign affairs (representing spillover). In one recent instance, the EP succeeded in forcing the resignation of the EU’s political executive. Its significance now far transcends the narrow function of ‘agenda-setting’.[16] As the enlargement of the EU continues, the ratification of the acquis communautaire and its translation into national legislation by the national parliaments of the candidate countries is necessary. The EP plays the role of go-between with the candidate countries, also bringing the latter’s concerns to the attention of the EU more broadly. Thus, for example, the EP’s blueprint for the Convention on the Future of Europe provided for attendance by representatives of the candidate countries, which had never before happened at any Inter-Governmental Conference.

Since the Single European Act in the mid-1980s, which originated in an initiative of Members of the European Parliament, the EP has become the driver behind the EU’s institutional development and adaptation to its changing international environment. The EP has provided the entire EU system with the momentum to overcome the hesitations by other EU organs to address new issues. It has been able consistently to innovate new instruments and strategies of action because, through its Members, it is in fact the organ of the EU that is closest that blurry frontier between the (EU) ‘system’ and its (international) ‘environment’. Amongst many examples one could mention, the initiative in the 1990s to orient EU programs concerning Eastern Europe towards ecological environmental and security, resulted from an initiative undertaken by MEPs. It was also the EP that came up with idea

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of the Convention on the Future of Europe as a means to meet the need for broad consultation with the publics and experts, so as to manage the vastly increased complexity of the EU’s institutional development.[17]

5.2. The Thessaloniki European Council, the Draft Constitution and Beyond

At the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, the draft EU constitution received backing as a ‘good basis’ for negotiations that will enhance the Union’s ability to act as a coherent and unified force in the international system. The Thessaloniki European Council also made three political statements. First, it noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the contribution of EU external action, including CFSP/ESDP to fight against terrorism, as reflected in the Presidency report on the subject (Annex I). Second, it endorsed the presidency report on this issue and noted with satisfaction the progress made in the field of military capabilities, the EU now having operational capabilities across the full range of Petersberg tasks; observed that recognized shortfalls could be alleviated by the further development of the EU’s military capabilities, including through the establishment of European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) Project groups; and noted that the operational capability of the EU has been reaffirmed through the launching of the three ESDP operations, these being the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Concordia in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Artemis in Bunia (Democratic Republic of Congo), providing strong impetus to the co-operation between the EU and the UN. Third, the Thessaloniki European Council welcomed the conclusion and implementation of EU–NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, which enhanced the operational capability of the EU and provided the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management.

The twenty-five EU leaders, present and future, attending the Summit also backed a new European security strategy, drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. The strategy urges the Member States to boost their military capacities and to pool their defence resources to counter successfully the three key threats presented by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime associated with failed states. It proposes three strategic objectives for the EU: first, to make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood; second, to build an international order based on effective multilateralism; and third, to tackle the new and old threats.[18]

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In the draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe, elaborated by the Convention, Article I–15 deals with the CFSP, extending the Union’s competence in matters of CFSP to all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence. Member States are urged to support actively and unreservedly the Union’s CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and to comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area, refraining from action contrary to the Union’s interests or likely impair its effectiveness. Articles I–39 and I–40 introduce special provisions for the implementation of both the CFSP and the ESDP. In both areas, the EP is to be consulted regularly on the main aspects and basic choices, and kept informed of how CFSP and ESDP evolve. Article I–43 deals with enhanced co-operation.

In the draft Treaty’s Part III, Title V (‘The Union’s External Action’), Chapter II is subdivided into two Sections: Articles III–190 through III–204 are on CFSP, and Articles III–205 through III–209 are on ESDP. The EP’s role is defined in Article III–200. It stipulates that the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a post to be established) shall consult the EP on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP (including the ESDP), ensure that its views are duly taken into consideration, and keep it regularly informed of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy, including the security and defence policy. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council and of the Minister for Foreign Affairs or make recommendations to them. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the CFSP, including the ESDP.[19]

The Italian Presidency of the EU was instructed to launch an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in October 2003 to negotiate the constitutional treaty. The IGC should finish in time for the new treaty to be signed in Rome (‘Rome II Treaty’) before the June 2004 elections for the European Parliament. As advocated by the EP, the ten candidate countries will participate in this process.

Notes

[Note 1]. This article is based on a paper originally presented to the Workshop on Identity and Representation in an Integrated Europe, organized by The Centre for European Studies with The Centre for Representation and Elections, Carleton University, and held in Ottawa, 9–10 May 2002. The authors thank Professor Nanette Neuwahl for motivating this revision of the original paper. The present text was finalized on 30 June 2003.

[Note 2]. Past treatments of the EP in European foreign relations include Marc Abélès, ‘Political Anthropology of a Transnational Institution: The European Parliament’ French Politics and Society 11 (Winter 1993); Roland Bieber, ‘Democratic Control of European Foreign Policy’, European Journal of International Law 1 (No. 1–2, 1990): 148–173; James Ellis, ‘The Foreign Policy Role of the European Parliament’, Washington Quarterly (Fall 1990); Juliet Lodge, ‘The European Parliament and Foreign Policy,’ in Manohar L. Sondhi (ed.), Foreign Policies and Legislatures: An Analysis of Seven Parliaments (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1988); and David Martin, ‘Progress towards European Union: EC Institutional Perspectives on the Intergovernmental

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Conferences — The View of the Parliament’, Aussenwirtschaft 48 (No. 3–4, 1991): 281–298.

[Note 3]. More recent literature of note includes: Fraser Cameron, ‘Building a Common Foreign Policy – Do Institutions Matter?’ in John Peterson and Helen Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998); J.J. Fernández Fernández, ‘El Tratado de Ámsterdam y la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común de la Unión: análisis crítico desde la óptica del Parlamento Europeo’, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 2 (No. 3, 1998): 79–111; D. Mammonas, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’, Greek Political Science Review , no. 19 (May 2002); Stelios Stavridis, ‘The Democratic Control of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy after Amsterdam and Nice’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe 10 (No. 3, 2001): 289–311; and Donatella M. Viola, International Relations and European Integration Theory: The Role of the European Parliament, Jean Monnet Working Paper 26 (Catania: University of Catania, Department of Political Studies, 2000).

[Note 4]. Robert M. Cutler, ‘The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society’, in Gordon S. Smith and Daniel Wolfish (eds.), Who Is Afraid of the State? Canada in a World of Multiple Centres of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), pp. 201–229. Further theoretical background is in Cutler, ‘Complexity Science and Knowledge-creation in International Relations Theory’, in Institutional and Infrastructural Resources, in Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (Oxford: EOLSS for UNESCO, 2003). Parts of the present work also draw on Cutler, ‘The European Parliament in Comparative International Perspective’, paper presented to the Second Conference of the European Sociological Association (Amsterdam, August 1999).

[Note 5]. In addition to these objectives of the CFSP proper, the general objectives of the Union set out in Article 2(b) of the TEU also apply. In addition Article 11(2) requires loyalty by the Member States to support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly, to refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or is likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations, and to work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity (added by the Treaty of Amsterdam). See further: Pierre des Nerviens, ‘Les relations extérieures’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 33, no. 4 (October–December 1997): 801–12, esp. 805–10.

[Note 6]. Cf. Gianfranco Verderame, ‘Le traité d’Amsterdam et ses suites : instruments de realisation d’une identité européenne dans le domaine de la politique extérieure’, Revue du Marché unique européen, 1999 (No. 1): 15–29.

[Note 7]. Cf. Oliver Costa, “Les relations entre la Commission et le Parlement européen au prisme du parlementarisme,” Politique européenne, 2001, no. 5 (Autumn): 27–44, esp. 30–35.

[Note 8]. Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam sought to clarify the nature of EU–WEU relations, stating that the EU would avail itself of the WEU to implement decisions which have defence implications, and that the EU would draw up political guidelines for such situations. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, would adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States who wish to, to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU. For its part, the WEU would be responsible for organizing the forces and the chain of command. On 26 April 2000, the Council approved the WEU exercise programme for 2001 and noted proposals for 2002 onwards, on the understanding that exercises in that period would be scheduled only following specific decisions to that effect, which would be taken in the light of relevant institutional developments. On 17 October 2000, the WEU military committee adopted the transition plan seeking, whilst the permanent structures of the EU took shape, to ensure continuity in crisis management. The WEU Military Staff, with its Planning Cell and Situation Centre, has been closed once its counterpart was set up within the EU, ensuring the EU’s crisis management responsibilities. The meetings of the Council of Ministers of the WEU in Oporto in May 2000 and in Marseille in November 2000 paved the way for the transfer to the EU of the WEU functions and structures, required for performing Petersburg tasks. As of 1 January 2002, two EU agencies, the Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies, incorporate the relevant features of the existing WEU structures.

[Note 9]. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 gave Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative, Secretary General of the WEU, a mandate to make full use of WEU assets in the interim period to prepare the EU for exercising its future responsibilities. At the WEU Assembly’s Special Session in Lisbon in March 2000, a proposal was launched to create a European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA), which would monitor the activities of the EU security bodies from the perspective of national parliamentarians. In June 2000, the WEU

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Assembly agreed to its transformation into the ‘Assembly of the Western European Union – the Interim European Security and Defence Assembly’. None of these initiatives had any real material effect, as the WEU ceased to exist.

[Note 10]. Cf. Jo Leinen, ‘Die Positionen und Erwartungen des Europäischen Parlaments zur Regierungskonferenz’, Integration 23, no. 2 (April 2000): 73–80.

[Note 11] . Loïck Benoit, ‘La lutte contre le terrorisme dans le cadre du deuxième pilier : un nouveau volet des relations extérieures de l’Union européenne’, Revue du droit de l’Union eur o péenne 2 (No. 2, 2002): 283–313.

[Note 12]. Cf. Rapport du Parlement européen, ‘Les progrès réalisés dans la mise en oeuvre de la PESC’ (Strasbourg, 26 September 2002), reproduced in Jean-Yves Haine (ed.), De Laeken à Copenhague: Les textes fondamentaux de la défense européenne, vol. III, Cahiers de Chaillot 57 (Paris: Institut d’Études de Sécurité, February 2003), pp. 121–131.

[Note 13]. See Ernst B. Haas, ‘International Integration: The European and the Universal Process’, pp. 93–147 in Karl W. Deutsch et al., International Political Communities: An Anthology, Anchor Books edn. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966); and Amitai Etzioni, ‘European Unification: A Strategy for Change’, pp. 175–197 in ibid. Cf. Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community’, pp. 69–118 in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[Note 14]. For conceptual treatments of the broader theme, see John S. Dryzek, ‘Transnational Democracy,’ Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (March 1999): 30–51; and David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996).

[Note 15]. Cf. Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level’, American Journal of Sociology 68 (1963): 407–421; reprinted at pp. 346–358 in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[Note 16]. George Tsebelis, ‘The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda- Setter,’ American Political Science Review 88 (March 1994): 128–142; Tsebelis and Amie Kreppel, ‘The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in European Integration,’ European Journal of Political Research 33 (No. 1, 1998): 41–71.

[Note 17]. The only other example of such broad influence by an international parliamentary institution in the evolution of a regional integration organization, and one very different in kind, was the unsuccessful attempt by the Commonwealth of Independent States Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, motivated by its president Ruslan Khasbulatov in the early 1990s, to motivate the establishment of pan–post-Soviet structures of governance across Central Eurasia, at a time when the political executives of the newly independent states were not yet firmly established institutionally in power.

[Note 18]. In 2000, Solana called ESDP development nothing less than ‘the integration project of the next decade’. See Javier Solana, ‘Die Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik – Das Integrationsprojekt der nächsten Dekade’, Integration 23 (January 2000): 1–6. Cf. Solana, ‘La politique européenne de sécurité et défense (PESD) est devenue opérationelle’, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, no. 457 (April 2002): 213–215.

[Note 19]. In the draft Constitution, the ESDP is referred to as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Also it is noteworthy that Article III–207 envisages the creation of a European Armament, Research and Military Capacities Agency, the statute, seat and operational rules of which should adopted by the Council, acting by qualified majority. Its tasks are defined as: contributing to identifying the Member States’ military capacity objectives and evaluating observance of the capacity commitments given by the Member States; promoting harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; proposing multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in terms of military capacities; ensuring co-ordination of the programs implemented by the Member States and management of specific co-operation programs; supporting defence technology research, and co-ordinating and planning joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; contributing to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

Dr. Robert M. Cutler [ website — email ] was educated at MIT and The University of Michigan, where he earned a Ph.D. in Political Science, and has specialized and consulted in the international affairs of Europe, Russia, and Eurasia since the late 1970s. He has held research and teaching positions at major universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia, and contributed to leading policy reviews and academic journals as well as the print and electronic mass media in three languages.

 
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