Housing the Orphans of European Security: How to Bring Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova in from the Cold

Robert M. Cutler

Housing the Orphans of European Security: How to Bring Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova in from the Cold

1. Introduction

From 1989 through 1991, while the Soviet bloc was falling apart but before the Soviet Union officially disintegrated, the EU had three choices for extending European construction eastwards.[1] These were: (1) widening itself by admitting more members from the “Central and Eastern Europe countries” (CEEC),[2] (2) exporting itself eastward as a “model,” and (3) developing itself as a security agent consciously promoting integration as a specific security tool.[3]

It chose the last of these via Association Agreements (AAs) that turned into the “Europa” Agreements, a variety of AA explicitly not modeled on early AAs such as those with Greece and Turkey.[4] Rather, the Europa Agreements were going to be tailor-made political umbrellas for the then-existing trade-and-cooperation agreements; and they were intended as a framework for encompassing the manifold cooperation (Phare, Erasmus, Lingua, etc.) which until then had been ongoing on ad hoc bases.

Although not so prescribed by the Treaty of Rome, AAs had in the past facilitated the integration into the EC, of states having market economies and roughly the same level of development as EC members but not subject to EC regulations. The EC's experience with the southern European countries during the 1970s marked AAs with an additional, political character assuring their integration of such countries into the norms of “Atlantic civilization,” including a multiparty system with the guarantee of human rights. The Europa Agreements with the CEEC were negotiated on the same legal basis as the earlier AAs with southern Europe (Articles 238 and 239 of the Rome Treaty).[5]

So as recently as a half-decade ago, the then-EC considered its relations with the CEEC in roughly the same category as those with then-EFTA members. Circumstances were compelling the EC to develop the Phare program into a general development aid program for Central and Eastern Europe, but despite the declaration by Jacques Delors in the early 1990s that the EC should be “a pole of attraction to be strengthened,”[6] the EC was not particularly seeking to be a pole of attraction. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s the EC was trying to collect value-added taxes, whereas the CEEC were still trying to create price systems for determining values to be taxed.

The EC's problems with the CEEC in the early 1990s included the difficulty in persuading national parliaments to devote attention to receiving well-intentioned advice, and even finding civil servants with the requisite technical training to understand the problems from a Western cultural perspective. These are precisely the practical problems faced by Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova today. In order to distinguish between post-communist states west of the Urals that could be eventual candidates for membership and those which could not be so, the EU invented, in the early 1990s the Partnership Agreement.

The “Partnership” instrument was originally designed to keep Russia from applying for membership, since “partners” are equals and an equal to the EU would not request to join it.[7] These agreements were subsequently extended to other newly independent states (NIS), with the exception of the Baltics.[8] Today only those countries that have signed Europa Agreements with the EU are possible candidates for future membership. Thus since the breakup of the USSR, the EU has chosen the second of the three aforementioned options as a means to the first. Promoting the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) and the Baltic Council are examples. It has yet to decide what to do about Eastern Europe to the Urals outside the CEFTA.[9] What is to be done?

This article begins with a survey of the situation of the three “orphans” of European security. For each of them, a period of emergence out from under the Soviet rubble (1990–1992) was followed by the beginning of a Western response (1993–1995). The next part of the article situates the orphans together in their relations with the two principal integration organizations of Central and Eastern Europe, viz., the CEFTA and the Central European Initiative (CEI, formerly Hexagonale, formerly Pentagonale). The contemporary position of the orphans is then evaluated. Four general policies are recommended to ameliorate their situation, and particular suggestions are made to illustrate how to put them into effect. There is a brief concluding section as well.

2. The Orphans of European Security in the 1990s

2.1. Belarus

2.1.1. The Emergence of Belarus (1990–1992)

Immediately following independence, Belarus sought to establish a foreign policy in the European tradition of the neutrality of small states, and in consonance with its adoption of the principle of neutrality in its 1990 declaration of sovereignty.[10] Minsk hoped that locating the executive organs of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its capital would support a nonaligned foreign policy, equally Eurocentric and Russocentric and, like the Baltic states, oriented on multilateral bases as a guarantee of independence. In the absence of Western incentives and attention, however, it was only a matter of time before Belarus adhered to a Russian sphere of influence. The dominance of Russian pressure upon Belarusian foreign policy confirmed itself through the state administrative and military apparatus. The weakness of the political opposition also contributed. That being so, the great question in Russian–Belarusian relations then became the terms of economic union between Belarus and Russia. Political circles in Russia favoring a type of “Slavic union” that would include Ukraine argued in favor of such an evolution. This was first postponed and then rendered impossible by the failure to resolve negotiations over the exchange rate between the existing Belarusian national currency and Russian rubles. Almost any exchange rate acceptable to Belarus would have represented an economically unjustifiable expenditure for Russia (as the exchange of Ostmarks for Deutschmarks cost Germany dearly).

2.1.2. The West's Response (1993–1995)

In Belarus the West was interested mainly in legitimizing the START I treaty to permit START II to enter into force. Other than this, the West did not define any significant interests in Belarus. In February 1993 Belarus, having already transferred strategic offensive nuclear weapons on its territory to Russian jurisdiction, ratified START I, and then the Lisbon Protocol as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Belarus felt entitled to expect significant compensation from the West for this, but it received a pittance. Very little of Belarus's nonmilitary production is of quality sufficient for export beyond the former USSR. Belarusian industrial production of Belarus was in large degree basically an assembly line for the Soviet military-industrial complex. This involved the final processing of parts and raw materials delivered from Russia and the rest of the former USSR. Belarusian national culture gives short shrift to the values that characterize entrepreneurialism, and Poles in Belarus tend mainly to go into commerce. The national traditions of Belarusian culture are at least as Central European as they are Slavic.

Nevertheless, a policy of “Baltic exceptionalism” led the West, both the U.S. and the EU, to ignore Belarusian security and the chance to help assure Russia's security cooperatively, constructively, and non-threateningly through Belarus. By contrast, nearly every effort was made to support the government of Lithuania in its negotiation of the departure of former Soviet troops and in its integration with northern European economic structures, infrastructures, and superstructures. Yet as 1995 dawned, Lukashenka was signing financial and economic accords with Ukraine although previous ones had not been implemented, and revoking economic reforms enacted by his parliament, explicitly adducing Belarus's abandonment by the West to justify his actions. Things have not changed much since then. In retrospect it is clear that Belarus fell between the dominant American concern with Russia and the Baltic states on the on hand and, on the other hand, the EC's emphasis on the “CEEC” as defined in the early 1990s to the exclusion of the NIS.

2.1.3. Belarus and the West since 1996

Belarus's international isolation has only increased in the last three years. Since then the retrograde policies of Lukashenka have alienated the country from Europe, bringing him only condemnation from the European security and multilateral political organizations. It is natural that he has sought to deepen his links with Russia, but the bilateral “Union” with Russia has been more of a political artefact than an economic reality. The integration of the general staffs of the two countries' militaries remains high.

The Belarusian people have no identifiable historical “cradle,” and Vilnius is more a cradle of Belarusian culture than any place in today's geographic Belarus.[11] Polish culture sometimes identifies Belarus with Russia, but Belarus together with Poland and Lithuania represents a cultural and historical unity. A Baltic–Belarusian geopolitical rapprochement would therefore have been logical, at least in the absence of Lukashenka; but life has not followed logic.

Belarus (along with Ukraine, Moldova, and three other associate members) became full member of the CEI in 1996. Since the privatization of agriculture is of the CEI's few declared aims, it is worthwhile recalling that German investors were actively interested in Belarus's agriculture, and small and medium enterprises, before there the Soviet Union disintegrated.[12] Other sectors that looked promising towards the end of the Soviet period were capital goods for agriculture and prefabricated construction. Nevertheless, Lithuania and Latvia have increased their commercial relations with Belarus, while Germany is on the way to becoming the country's main non-Russian economic partner.

The administrative structure inherited by Belarus from the Soviet system, and still maintained, is almost a carbon copy of that of the former East Germany. Beyond attracting Western investment, it may be possible for Minsk to regain its historical role as a crossroads of land and water transport. The entire region could thus to re-emerge as an intermediary borderland of Europe, and nonetheless crucial for this. For that to happen, however, requires some modification of Belarus's currently very strict border-control regime; and that probably requires Lukashenka's departure from power. However, Lukashenka remains popular because the public mind in Belarus associates economic and political liberalization with economic decline.

2.2. Ukraine

2.2.1. The Emergence of Ukraine (1990–1992)

Ukraine was inevitably affected by the waves of economic reform in Russia in the early 1990s; nevertheless, then-President Kravchuk did not encourage market reforms in Ukraine. The status of the Crimean peninsula and the division of the Black Sea fleet complicated Ukraine's relations with Russia.

Yet it is not sufficiently recognized that Ukraine's relations with Russia are in fact as integral aspect of a triangle with Germany. An intense Russian–Ukrainian conflict in the Crimea or Odessa area could possibly involve Germany because of the ethnic Germans there; and Germany's involvement under some multilateral aegis would be likely. Moreover, Kravchuk played a “German card” at difficult times in order to gain Germany's attention, seeking assistance in joining European institutions. For example, his February 1992 decree rehabilitating ethnic Germans would theoretically have allowed a half-million of them to return to Ukrainian territory, particularly in southern Ukraine and in the agricultural sector. Kravchuk's primary motives (which came during an impasse in the development of Ukraine's relations with Russia and Russia's moves to rehabilitate its Germans) included the desire to gain German support for Ukrainian territorial integrity, so as to order to counteract a Russocentric tendency in German policy. Although it is not clear whether he had German settlement in Crimea in mind, it seems that also hoped to obtain German technical assistance and private investment, and perhaps solve some of the demographic and economic problems of the Black Sea region. In response, Germany rethought its policy on the German diaspora in the NIS and decided to increase its spending on ethnic Germans there, as this was less expensive than patriating them to Germany.[13]

There was a sustained level of violence in Crimea for quite some period of time during the highest tension, but this diminished especially after Kuchma's election as president. Crimea now enjoys de facto autonomy in certain spheres of competence, with the understanding that it will not seek a change in its juridical status.[14] After a great deal of high-level disputation and political posturing throughout 1992, Ukraine and Russia signed in mid-1993 an accord postponing the division of the Black Sea fleet until 1995, when the issue was indeed basically settled. The main economic issues complicating Ukrainian–Russian relations have involved energy and balance of payments questions; and the West's multilateral financial institutions, and the U.S. in its bilateral relations, have played an important role in the ad hocresolution of these matters. Ukraine also has the potential to be an exporter of meat and grain, foodstuffs that Russia must import.

Ukraine was justifiably disappointed with the Western response to its own antinuclear and military policy. As a newly nuclear power, Ukraine ratified without hesitation the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe and agreed to transfer all nuclear weapons and matériel to Russia for storage and destruction. Since this effectively neutralized Russia's nuclear muscle, Ukraine supposed that it would be rewarded with more than sympathetic words. In the end, Russia and Ukraine had similar interests in dismantling their nuclear weapons, and the Americans play the broker between them. The difference between the two is that whereas American interest in Russia is inevitable, Ukraine, having no guarantee that it would not be simply forgotten after the nuclear issue was settled, for a long time felt that the nuclear card is its final card to play vis-à-vis the U.S. and the West.

2.2.2. The West's Response (1993–1995)

Whereas Belarus is a “regional” country, Ukraine is a “strategic” country. With Kazakhstan it is, for both Russia and the West, the most important non-Russian NIS. The West's interests in Ukraine are, by comparison with those in Belarus, are harder to deny but no easier to define. Whereas in Belarus the West's great error has been inattention, in Ukraine the West was, despite paying attention, for a long time unable to determine comprehensively what it wants. Ukraine's potential economic appeal to Europe lies in its manpower, agriculture, and perhaps its energy resources if a way is found to develop these on a market basis. For its part, Ukraine needs ties with market economies, and the NIS cannot really provide these at present. Yet before Ukraine can make the transition to stable economic partner of the EU and the West, it needs to consolidate an economic space with Russia and other NIS.

Ukraine, like Belarus, lacks a well-established reform policy; unlike Belarus, it has made nevertheless some progress. Foreign investment remains, however, problematic. German investors could easily visit Belarus and decide where to invest (if Belarus were to enable this), because the country is fairly small and the lines of authority relatively easy to trace. In Ukraine, on the other hand, it is harder to know who is in charge on the various subordinate administrative levels. After Kuchma's election as president, Europe had to rethink their whole approach to Ukraine, seeking targets of opportunity in terms both of their economic assistance to the country and their own influence. Aside from economic assistance, Kuchma for his part had difficulty clarifying what he would like from the West.

In 1995, however, there began an important shift in Ukraine's relations with “Europe.” Its acceptance as a member of the Council of Europe, while a formality, is a very important symbol in Kiev. The Ukrainian leadership felt that this, plus the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, showed Russia that Europe has not forgotten Ukraine and considers it a partner of mainstream Europe. The delicacy of the situation from Europe's standpoint was manifest in its soon-thereafter admission of Russia into the Council of Europe, justified by the “free and fair” parliamentary elections there. Europe does not want to say that Ukraine is European but Russia is not.[15]

2.2.3. Ukraine and the West since 1996

After difficult diplomatic movements in 1996, the year 1997 marked the confirmation of a stage in the stabilization of Ukraine's geopolitical situation, begun in late 1994 when the U.S., the EU, and Russia offered Ukraine multilateral guarantees of its territorial integrity. These formal security guarantees, given to Ukraine by the West towards the end of 1994, with Russia as co-signatory, went a long way towards calming Ukraine's discomfiture over the prospect of its own domestic regional differences being exploited by foreign powers. Such a process of calming, preparatory to the current active phase of Ukrainian diplomacy, was continued also by the G−7 meeting in Winnipeg, Canada, at the end of 1994, dedicated to examining and promoting Ukrainian reform, of which the psychological significance cannot be underestimated.

The auspiciousness of 1997 was foretokened by the parliament's adoption, in mid-January, of a document on “The Conception of National Security of Ukraine. ” In the first half of 1997 Ukraine participated with Russia and Moldova in the effective settlement of the Transdnistria conflict; moved to consolidate geostrategic partnership with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in providing a Transcaucasian corridor oil transport from the circum-Caspian region; and consolidated also ties with the Baltic states and Poland (joint presidential communiqué of 27 May). Also in May, the Ukrainian president signed a joint declaration with his Polish counterpart; and, moreover, the historic Ukrainian–Russian Friendship Treaty was signed, which confirmed the settlement of the Black Sea Fleet problem and provided for cooperation in a host of areas such as joint promotion of the socioeconomic infrastructure of Sevastopol. As if that were not enough, then in July 1997 the “Charter on a Distinctive NATO–Ukraine Partnership” was signed; and this catalogue of diplomatic achievements does not even mention the treaty with Romania on territorial issues left over from the Second World War or various agreements with Belarus.[16]

2.3. Moldova

2.3.1. The Emergence of Moldova (1990–1992)

From the beginning of the decade, the situation in Moldova has had several aspects in common with that in Estonia. Russians in the Transdnistria represent only about one-quarter of the population there (another quarter are Ukrainians and two-fifths are Moldovans), but three-quarters of all Russians in Moldova live not on the left bank of the Dniester but on the right, where there have been no ethnic problems and no out-migration of ethnic Russians. As is the case in Estonia, the officer corps of the Russian 14th Army has long lived in Moldova. However, the Transdnistria situation was originally less one of ethnic separatism than effectively a revolt of an administrative division of the Red Army. Western influence in Moldova was been slightly clearer and clearly beneficial.

Western interests in Moldova originated with a concern about the surprisingly large quantity of armaments (including light arms) possessed by the 14th Army, and the possibly destabilizing role these could play if Tiraspol because to traffic in them. (Insurgents in Georgia and freebooters in Azerbaijan were known to have obtained many weapons from ex-Soviet soldiers in Europe who were withdrawn to Kaliningrad, and it was feared that Transdnistria could be a secondary source of supply.) A Russian–Ukrainian–Romanian–Moldovan forum created to resolve the conflict in March 1992 was never implemented. Since July 1992 a trilateral Russian–Moldovan–Transdnistria peace-keeping force has been in place, and a CSCE mission has been on site since mid-1993. The proposals by the CSCE were instrumental in promoting movement towards a political settlement of the conflict in Moldova until the recent exacerbation of the situation mentioned below.[17]

2.3.2. The West's Response (1993–1995)

In December 1993, CSCE ministers affirmed that Transdnistria should have a special status within Moldova and that the issue of Russian troop withdrawals should not be linked to other question. However, despite softening of language legislation in spring 1994 to accommodate Moldovans belonging to ethnic minorities, and despite the Moldovan government's readiness to grant special status to the Transdnistria region, the situation did not greatly improve.

The second half of 1994 saw significant concrete developments toward a settlement from both sides. In a separate but related development In December 1994, the Moldovan government passed legislation granting autonomy to its Gagauz minority. This arrangement is satisfactory to both sides: Chisinau retains control of foreign policy and police and the appointment of judges, and explicitly provided the guarantee of Gagauzia's possibility of “external territorial self-determination” in the event of eventual Moldovan unification with Romania. This arrangement could have served as a model for the definitive resolution of the Transdnistrian situation. However, in the December 1995 elections Transdnistria voted to adopt an independent constitution and (with the encourage of the Russian Communist Party) asked on that basis to participate in the CIS.

2.3.3. Moldova and the West since 1996

Moldova has very recently deepened its cooperation with Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan to establish the so-called “GUAM” grouping, focusing its attention in the first instance on the Transcaucasian oil export corridor.[18] Most recently, the Transdnistria question has been settled, mostly on the Gagauzia model, with the region retaining not only its own government but also symbols of distinct juridical personality (anthem, etc.) as well as the right to self-determination, “should Moldova,” in the words of the agreement, “lose her independence” (i.e., should Moldova unify with Romania).

The most significant remaining problem is border-demarcation between Moldova and Ukraine in the region, a thorny issue not only because of the presence of a significant Ukrainian-speaking population, but also because it has implications for frontage on the Black Sea, which means access to and services for the port of Dunai, which in turn means onward westward transit of oil shipped from the Sea's eastern ports such as Poti in Georgia. As for Moldova, one should not rule that that it will either be voluntarily annexed to Romania or at least acquire special privileges when the latter seeks to join the EU in a decade or two.

3. Policies to House the Orphans in Europe

3.1. Deepening Transborder Cooperation

Economic geography, often neglected by political experts in the present day, remains highly significant for citizenries that produce, sell, and consume economic goods.[19] It would be well for either the EU or the EBRD to continue to promote a renaissance of transborder and interregional cooperation in Eastern Europe between the former eastern border of the USSR and the Urals. This cooperation is not just a temporary bandage for poor state-to-state relations. The Moldova example shows it to be an integral part of the very establishment of stable relations and conflict settlement. Thus Ukraine and Russia several years ago approved and sponsored transborder cooperation between the local governments in the Donbass and Stavropol regions, not unlike the transborder cooperation implemented under the EU's aegis between its members. This was one of the first concrete cooperative measures that the two countries took with practical effect, and it contributed greatly to stabilizing the ethnically sensitive situation in Ukraine's Donbass. That, in turn, created conditions for moving towards the normalization of relationships just realized.

Such transborder arrangements are increasingly frequent in the former Soviet Union: adjacent Kazakhstani and Russian regions, for example, having long-standing economic links that are being renovated on a local transborder level. These should be encouraged throughout the NIS as a pillar not only of economic stability but also of political and strategic security. Such arrangements not only represent, in their own way, a confidence building measure between the parties involved, but also have the practical effects of linking together the economic geographies of the NIS, with concrete results for the populations and the creation of popular constituencies for cooperation.

3.2. Anchoring Russia in Europe

Belarus lies astride the invasion route taken by German armies from Brest-Litovsk to Moscow. Its strategic significance has diminished in proportion to the lowered probability of military conflict between Russia and Europe. Belarus's geopolitical significance to the West is also attenuated by the dependence of Belarus's economy upon Russia, inherited from the Soviet period.[20] It would be worthwhile, therefore, for Belarus even to seek membership in the Council of Baltic Sea States (as distinct from the trilateral Baltic Council). Despite continuing cooperation among the three Baltic states, their foreign and security policies are diverging more than is generally recognized: Latvia and Estonia are “heading north” towards Finland and Sweden, while Lithuania is “heading west” towards Poland: which movement could in the long run help anchor Belarus in the West as a window on Russia.

Likewise, with Russia's dependence upon Ukraine for transport to European markets now established, the economic anchoring of Ukraine in Europe can be further accomplished by promotion of private enterprise in the west of the country, formerly part of Austria-Hungary, where the historical experience of something resembling market-oriented capitalism has not yet disappeared from living memory. The cities of Lviv and especially Uzhgorod are signal in this regard. It is feasible and common-sensical to integrate these cities into transport systems based in the Visegrad−4 countries. Uzhgorod is especially well placed to become a center of transborder regional development if proper incentives can be established and interest heightened.

3.3. Promoting Democratization

In retrospect we can see that the West's great error in Belarus was to ignore the evolution of domestic political forces and to hold back from the promoting economic reform. Indeed, the election of Lukashenka as president in Belarus itself came originally as a great surprise, just as did the results of the recent parliamentary elections. The election of Lukashenka as president, together with the evident political defeat in Russia of monetary union with Belarus, offered the West a brief window to recoup its errors of inattention and irresolution from the early 1990s. Sections of the new parliament and government were open to extending cooperation with the West. But the opportunity was not seized, probably because no one in a policy-making position in North America thought Belarus important enough for sustained attention. Likewise in Ukraine, Kuchma's election surprised a great many Western observers, as did the economic reforms he subsequently introduced. There is no justification for this.

The United States has been much more concerned with democratization in the newly independent states than Europe has been. Indeed, the EU's democratization program for the post-communist states, adopted at the insistence of the United Kingdom, is the only real manifestation of its Europe's concern with public opinion in the former Soviet bloc and its impact upon national policies. The European Parliament (EP) has a dormant potential here. Through the transnational party networks it has established, it is possible for instances of the EU informally to widen contacts beyond the government circles in the NIS, creating dialogue interested parliamentary oppositions where appropriate. In the early 1990s, the European Parliament occasionally had broader contacts and deeper discussions with those oppositions than did the actual governments of the very states themselves. This transnational dialogue contributed, for example, to the elaboration of formal (territorial) security guarantees to Ukraine endorsed by Russia and the Western powers.

4. Multilateral Central-European Instruments for Housing the Orphans in Europe

4.1. The Central European Free Trade Association

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland would have actively promoted common cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s if the EC had encouraged them. This would have been to the advantage both of the EU and the countries concerned, but the EU did not want to force them to cooperate, and to the countries concerned any cooperation smacked too much of CMEA. They invited Ukraine to participate in the antecedent “Visegrad group” very early on in 1992, but Ukraine declined out of concern that this might be construed as anti-Russian. Once they established CEFTA, though, Ukraine's participation was de facto excluded, because in comparison with them Ukraine is a “large” country whose membership in an economic union would upset their mutual relative equilibrium.

The EU saw no reason to encourage these countries to concert their efforts in their separate negotiations in the early 1990s with itself. Yet had the EU said such cooperation was desirable in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they would have pursued the initiative much more deeply and seriously.[21] The evidence for this is the fact that the countries (now four with the split of Czechoslovakia) established CEFTA, with a small Secretariat, within weeks after the EU suggested this.[22] Indeed their defense ministers met and discussed military cooperation, the countries' first high-level meeting in over eighteen months, within days after NATO's announcement of the Partnership for Peace initiative.

If CEFTA had allowed Belarus and Ukraine to join in the course of the last two years, then the CEFTA could have transformed itself into an “intermediate” structure unthreatening to Russia after the Visegrad−4 join the EU. In October 1995 at its Warsaw meeting, CEFTA decided to establish, as conditions for membership in the group, that a state must be already a member of the World Trade Organization and have a Europa (Association) Agreement with the EU. It decided to work to lift trade barriers among its members and to work towards the entry of its members into other European IOs. CEFTA thus has consolidated itself as the post-communist anteroom to the EU for formerly centrally-planned economies.[23]

4.2. The Central European Initiative

The tasks of this organization have certainly changed since the late 1980s when it was founded. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Central European Initiative (CEI) succeeded in putting together commercial contacts in private and public sectors among its members, for relatively small and medium entrepreneurial and service (e.g., touristic) industries. There is no longer a bipolar bloc system in Europe to bridge. The CEI needs the means to take up the slack in regions of Europe where other integrative structures have not, for whatever reasons, reached. Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova are, each for different reasons, such places.

The principal difficulty that the CEI has faced since 1989 have been the multiplication of its member caused by with the disintegration of multinational states. This has complicated its activities in the simplest logistical manner: new foreign ministries, even in states not engaged in military conflict with their neighbors, had neither the personnel nor the attention to devote. The second difficulty faced by the CEI has been a lack of financial means. Over the last few years the organization has therefore limited its activities mainly to meetings of expert groups. Only at the end of 1995 was it even able to take a decision to establish a documentation center, to be located in Trieste.[24]

The CEI's difficulties have been compounded by the obsolescence of its original task when founded in the late 1980s, viz., to bridge a bipolar bloc system in Europe that soon thereafter ceased to exist. The CEI is becoming, among other things, an anteroom to CEFTA. It has been announced that in 1996 the six associate members of CEI will become full members. The members of CEI will then be: two EU members (Italy and Austria); four CEFTA members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia); two other small ex-CMEA members which have signed AAs with the EU and are prospective members (Bulgaria and Romania); Albania plus four former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Croatia), some of which, like Slovenia, are more likely to qualify eventually for EU membership but none of which is excluded a priori; and three NIS of the ex-USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), none of which is considered by Brussels to be an eventual candidate for membership. Although not designed as such, these strongly resemble concentric circles around an EU-oriented center. Insofar as that is so, it is clear that the NIS are on the outer fringes.

4.3. Economic Development from the Baltic to the Black Sea

The West has been able to work with Russia towards the demilitarization and economic development of Kaliningrad, which was in a very dire situation earlier in the decade. This resolution is due in large part to the work of the EU, which, motivated by the EP, encouraged the implantation there of a branch of a German bank that now makes loans to small industry and for agricultural development. With a German bank now experienced in Kaliningrad and an EBRD office now in St. Petersburg, the organizational infrastructure is in place for serious on-site studies and project development by interested Western partners in Belarus, and conceivably in Moldova and Ukraine as well.[25]

Without threatening to create a cordon sanitaire “from the Baltic to the Black Sea,” this would promote a potential link between the CEI and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC), which is developing its activities with strong EU and EBRD organizational support, and of which Ukraine is an important member. The problem here is that the CEI still exhibits a relatively low level of institutionalization.[26]

5. Conclusion

What kind of integration and what kind of security, then, does the EU seek for Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? The EU lost its chance to make an impact on the Visegrad−4 group in the early 1990s because it was concentrating so intently on the Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) preparing the Maastricht Treaty. Even informal CEEC representatives were not even in the corridors to learn what was going at those negotiations, despite the fact that decisions were being taken that would affect their foreign trade, the strengths of their national currencies, and the conditions under which any eventual request for membership would be entertained. The EU consequently lost prestige and reputation among vast strata of the newly politically socialized CEEC mass publics, as well as among many leading politicians and decision makers. These countries are still interested only because they have searched in vain for anywhere else to turn.

Still in the early and mid-1990s, some figures in the EU (in both the Commission and the Parliament) hesitated not only at the prospect of Central Asia but also at promoting developments West of the Urals. However, the successful resolution of the difficult Kaliningrad situation, including its participation along with St. Petersburg, both of which enjoy a large degree of economic autonomy, as Russia's representatives in the Council of Baltic Sea States (not to be confused with the Baltic Council), was signal in helping to change their mind.[27] Once that mind was open, simple economic geography confirmed the good sense of such openness: for example, the natural transmission route for oil resources in northwestern Kazakhstan to Europe is across southern Russian and the Caucasus through Ukraine.

Having now signed agreements with the governments of the Soviet successor states, however, and having begun to extend technical assistance and other aid to them, what other policy instruments are available to the EU to promote cooperative security among them? Such instruments include assuring the efficiency of cooperation under the Phare and TACIS programs, with special attention to technical assistance and project programming; the creation of legal systems and promotion of Free Trade Areas and Payments Unions where appropriate; and continuing to engage the international financial institutions.

Medium-term economic interdependence among the Soviet successor states has already reinforced among some of them, a security entente under Russian aegis within CIS-space. The reconstruction and development of these states requires the institutionalization of such arrangements, particularly cooperative regimes for nonmilitary security. Such regimes need not include all successor states, and they may be established both within and outside the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and among subsets of its members. Cooperative institutional structures need not extend over the entire territory of the former USSR. The CIS will continue its trend to resemble a unique “matryoshka” organization like a set of nested wooden Russian dolls, with agreements and arrangements encompassing now twelve, now nine, now five or three members, forming an infrastructure of cooperation within the broad all-member CIS.

Now that the West has taken action to anchor Kyiv in Europe, and Ukraine has signed a friendship treaty with Russia on an equal basis, nothing prevents Ukraine from consolidating its ties with CIS-based formations. It is considering inviting Russian capital investment into its own industrial plant,[28] and is deepening ties with the so-called “GUAM” (Georgia–Ukraine–Azerbaijan–Moldova) group. However, it is clear that when the West offers no pro-active interest in the political evolution of “CIS-space,” countries will turn towards Russia. The Belarus–Russia treaty as well the quadripartite Russia–Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan–Belarus accord illustrate a trend that will accentuate if Western interest and policy again become inattentive and vacuous.

Notes

[Note 1]. The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

[Note 2]. The term “Central and Eastern European countries,” originally designating only the small CMEA countries, was first proposed unofficially by Germany, for use inside the EC, and was adopted for official use in Brussels in 1988–89. It remained current as late as 1994, despite the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the corresponding expansion of the scope of the EU's concern. The phrase was replaced by the designation “East European and Central Asian countries” (including Russia) only in 1994. The appellation “CEEC” is retained here when the period of its currency is under discussion. For the same reason, when the pre-Maastricht period is at issue, reference is made to the EC rather than to the EU. Though confusing at first, this practice enforces maintenance of the perspective of the time.

[Note 3]. Reinhardt Rummel, “The CFSP and European Construction,” paper presented to the Second Biennial Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Fairfax (Virginia, USA), 22–24 May 1991.

[Note 4]. As juridically defined under Articles 238 and 239 of the Rome Treaty, AAs were never intended to be a step towards eventual membership. In practice this has nevertheless frequently, though not always, been the case. In the present instance, see “Pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et États indépendants de l'ancienne Union soviétique: Relations bilatérales / Etats indépendants de l'ancienne Union soviétique autres que la Fédération russe et l'Ukraine,” Bulletin UE (March 1994), para. 1.3.49.

[Note 5]. But see Andrea Eltetö, “The European Union, Eastern Enlargement and Mediterranean Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis,” Die Visegrad-Staaten auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union 5 (Ebenhausen/Isar: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996).

[Note 6]. Jacques Delors, Le nouveau concert européen (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1992), p. 206.

[Note 7]. Author's interviews, Brussels, 1991–1993 (various dates).

[Note 8]. H.-H. Hohmann, C. Meier, and H. Timmermann, “The European Community and the Countries of the CIS: Political and Economic Relations,” Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 151–176. One often hears “Russia and the NIS” spoken of, although Russia is also, technically speaking, an NIS. “NIS” is the designation preferred by Washington (which never recognized the Baltics' incorporation into the USSR) for the non-Baltic former Soviet republics. Insofar as the Baltic states are realistic candidates for EU membership, whereas the other twelve former Soviet republics are not, there is some contemporary practical sense in this distinction.

[Note 9]. See Richard E. Baldwin, “The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” European Economic Review, vol. 29, no. 4 (April 1995), pp. 474–481.

[Note 10]. For an interesting analysis of the early period, from the standpoint of international law and traditional diplomatic practice, see the paper by Ural Latypov, “Neutrality as a Factor in Belarusian Security Policy” (Sandhurst: Royal Military Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, February 1994).

[Note 11]. For background, see Stephen R. Burant, “International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbors — Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine,” Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 3 (1993), pp. 395–418.

[Note 12]. Author's interviews, Minsk, July 1991.

[Note 13]. Marion Recktenwald, “The Ethnic Factor in German–Ukrainian Relations: The Role of the German Diaspora and Its Broader Implications,” paper presented to the Workshop The Role of the Ethnic Factor in Russian–Ukrainian and Russian–Estonian Relations, Women in International Security (WIIS), Tallinn, 14–18 October 1993.

[Note 14]. Denis J.B. Shaw, “Crimea: Background and Aftermath of Its 1994 Presidential Election,” Post-Soviet Geography, vol. 35, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 221–34.

[Note 15]. Author's interviews, Brussels, Summer 1994.

[Note 16]. For an extended summary, see Yurii Shcherbak, “The Geopolitical Situation of Ukraine at Present and in the Future,” Analysis of Current Events, vol. 9, no. 8 (August 1997), pp. 6–7, 14.

[Note 17]. For background, see Pal Kolsto, Andrei Edemsky, and Natalya Kalashnikova, “The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism,” Europe–Asia Studies, vol. 45, no. 6 (1993), pp. 973–1000.

[Note 18]. See, for example: Asia Gadzhizadze and Mikhail Voronin, “Petr Luchinskii posetil Baku v Tbilisi,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1997, no. 228 (3 December), p. 3.

[Note 19]. In the West, scholars trained in Germany are the chief exception to this tendency. (Specialists trained in certain schools in Russia represent the other exception.) One of the few comprehensive surveys, though of variable quality and a bit outdated in its political aspects, is Klaus Segbers and Stephan DeSpiegeleire (eds.), Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, Aktuelle Materialien zur Internationalen Politik 40, 4 vols. (Baden-Baden: Nomos for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), esp. vol. 2, Emerging Geopolitical and Territorial Units. See also Barbara Pietzonka, Ethnisch-territoriale Konflikte in Kaukasien: Eine politisch-geographische Systematisierung, Schriftenreihe 26 (Baden-Baden: Nomos for Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1997).

[Note 20]. For a good recent treatment (dated 7 July 1997) see Olga Alexandrova and Heinz Timmermann, Russland–Belarus–GUS: Integrationsbestrebungen und Desintegrationstendenzen, Bericht 30/1997 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1997).

[Note 21]. See the prescient article by Gabor Bakos, “After COMECON: A Free Trade Area in Central Europe?” Europe–Asia Studies, 45 (December 1993), pp. 1025–44.

[Note 22]. For the original text, see International Legal Materials, vol. 34, no. 3 (1995).

[Note 23]. Thus Slovenia also has become a CEFTA member but the Baltics are not yet in, although they have, with Bulgaria and Romania, been designated CEFTA “Associate Members,” which mainly means that they are negotiating free-trade agreements with CEFTA's full members. More generally, see Siegfried Schultz, “Transformationsländer und multilaterales Handelssystem: Schnellere Einbindung erforderlich,” Wochenbericht DIW Berlin, 1996, no. 5.

[Note 24]. Robert Niczewski, “Central European Initiative Summit: Much Ado About Cooperation,” Warsaw Voice, 1995, no. 42 (October 15).

[Note 25]. Cf. Christian Meier, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den Staaten Osteuropas: regionale Kooperation auf dem Prüfstand, Bericht 36/1995 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1995).

[Note 26]. In this connection, see also the Final Document of the International Conference “Security in Europe: Central European Component” (Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for International Security Studies, 1995), available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/uciss/uciss1.htm> (accessed 27 September 1997). This Conference was held in four stages during 1993–1995 with participants from Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine and invited guests from NATO and WEU. The Final Document was adopted 28–29 June 1995 in Kyiv.

[Note 27]. See the important and influential report by Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmermann, Kaliningrad (Königsberg): eine russische Exklave in der baltischen Region — Stand und Perspektiven aus europäischer Sicht, Bericht 17/1993 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1993). Also of interest is Norbert Wein, “Die Exklave Kaliningrad/Königsberg: eine geographische und geopolitische Bestandsaufnahme,” Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie, vol. 38, nos. 1–2 (1994), pp. 101–109.

[Note 28]. On this, see Marion Recktenwald, “Ukraine's Russian Minority and Russia's Ukrainian Policies,” Analysis of Current Events, vol. 9, no. 8 (August 1997), pp. 8–9.

Dr. Robert M. Cutler [ website — email ] was educated at MIT and The University of Michigan, where he earned a Ph.D. in Political Science, and has specialized and consulted in the international affairs of Europe, Russia, and Eurasia since the late 1970s. He has held research and teaching positions at major universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia, and contributed to leading policy reviews and academic journals as well as the print and electronic mass media in three languages.

 
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