U.S. Interests and
Cooperative Security in Abkhazia and Karabakh: Engagement versus
Commitment?
Robert M. Cutler
This chapter is made available in
 full text.
|
AbstractThe chapter examines the evolution of U.S.
interests in three South Caucasus conflict situations in the 1990s. It briefly assesses the relevant
national security doctrine, such as it existed, then moves to survey U.S. policy behavior in the selected
cases. On that basis is assesses the
applicability of “cooperative security,” already animating certain signficant aspects of
U.S. security policy, to the cases in question. In the process it disentangles the meanings of cooperative security, engagement, and commitment,
arriving at conclusions as to their interrelationships in the cases to hand. In conclusion, the article points out the significance of financial
stabilization for the countries concerned and what can be done in this respect, including possibilities
for enhancing their cooperation among themselves the assistance of international and possibly regional
institutions.
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Contents
- U.S.
Interests and Security Doctrine in the Caucasus
- U.S. Policy
Behavior
- Cooperative
Security, Engagement, and Commitment
- Conclusion:
The Key Role of Financial Stabilization in Conflict Resolution
|
Suggested citation for this
webpage:
Robert M. Cutler, “U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in
Abkhazia and Karabakh: Engagement versus Commitment,” in Mehmet
Tütüncü (ed.), Caucasus: War and Peace; The New World
Disorder and Caucasia (Haarlem: SOTA, 1998), pp. 132–144
available at
⟨http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ch98mt.html⟩ accessed 15 November 2024. |
[ page 132 ]
U.S. Interests and
Cooperative Security in Abkhazia and Karabakh: Engagement versus
Commitment?
Robert M. Cutler
When the Soviet Union began to fall apart in the late 1980s,
it had been decades since any U.S. power had had a genuine opportunity directly
to influence events in the Soviet area. With the exception of residual British traditions in South
Asia, residual Turkish traditions in the South Caucasus, and residual north
European traditions in the Baltics, the U.S. had grown accustomed to a loss of
specific geopolitical interest (as distinct from universal normative interest).
The disintegration of Soviet power led to the creation of greater or lesser
power centers throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet area.
The U.S. was not accustomed to having interests in many of
these newly self-constituting international regions, but it continued the habit
of engaging in diplomatic conduct according to established norms. This was,
indeed, a necessity. Moreover, as a result of a decrease in the proportion of
the U.S. surplus national product that can be devoted to military and strategic
goals has decreased, and greatly more expensive advanced military systems due
to higher levels of technological integration, the category of “national
interest” has come to supplant that of “national security” in U.S. foreign
policy-making discourse as a means of distinguishing between threats to “vital”
vs. “nonvital” interests. This makes it possible to assert (as was done for
months during the Bush Administration with respect to the Balkans) that
such-and-such part of the world may have security problems but that those
security problems do not directly affect U.S. interests.
Although in the very beginning the United States seemed to
want to count on Russia to assure transit of energy resources to the West, it
soon became clear that Russia was consciously or unconsciously seeking to put a
stranglehold on the export of these resources from the Caucasus. As Russia
increasingly sought, in the early and mid-1990s, to heighten its influence in
the region through playing the countries off against one another (e.g.,
Armenia/Azerbaijan) and meddling in the countries’ internal social and
political affairs (the Abkhaz rebellion), the U.S. saw that export routes
independent of Russia could increase the autonomy of these countries,
diminishing Russia’s control and so opening the door to greater American
influence or at least a balance of great powers
[ page 133 ]
(including Iran an Turkey) in the region.
The U.S. after 1989 therefore acted as if it had
interests, and its actions were interpreted by all concerned as intended to
promote those interests. It was assumed that the U.S. acted in such-and-such a
manner because it supposed that it could thereby achieve such-and-such a goal,
U.S. behavior thus created its interests in the minds of those
concerned, who reified that behavior into interest.[1] That behavior, and its inferred patterns, engendered
responses from other parties, to which the U.S. is now responding by redefining
and refining its interests. At nearly the same time, the notion of
cooperative security became more broadly elaborated in U.S. policy
circles and was applied in specific circumstances.
Ethnic unrest in Georgia first broke out in southern Ossetia
under Gamsakhurdia, but this escalated in mid-1992 under Shevardnadze. Within a
period of weeks over 100,000 refugees fled to northern Ossetia, a part of the
Russian Federation, where Ingush refugees in the Prigorodnyi region were simultaneously demanding the re-attachment of that region (severed by Stalin) to
Ingushetia. Their presence strained resources, led to disputes over the
latter's rights to remain there, and resulting unrest necessitated the
appointment of a special prefect from Moscow to head an emergency
administration. Northern and southern Ossetians alike began to call for
reunification of their territory. Georgia being the only of the twelve
non-Baltic former republics that had not adhered to the CIS, Russia brokered an
agreement providing for the deployment of a tripartite Russian, Georgian, and
Ossetian force to guarantee civil peace in southern Ossetia, encouraging
residents to return there. Shevardnadze had hoped to use the installation of a
ceasefire in southern Ossetia as a breathing-space to turn his attention to
liquidating the Gamsakhurdist rebellion in western Georgia. However, it was
almost immediately thereupon, in late July 1992, that the Abkhaz conflict,
unexpectedly to most observers, broke out. The Abkhaz rebellion festered
through the fall and winter of 1992–1993, during which
[ page 134 ]
time Shevardnadze
won a landslide presidential victory. Disputes over the possession of former
Soviet military equipment following upon withdrawal of the Russian army
exacerbated relations between Russia and Georgia during the autumn, and the
Russian military was already ill disposed toward Shevardnadze whom they blamed
personally for complicity in the disintegration of the Soviet state.
Whereas Russia has operated more or less unilaterally to
mediate ceasefires in Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1992 and 1993, and in 1994
arranged for the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force in the latter area, the
United States has relied upon multilateral institutions to assure stability in
the region, supporting efforts by the OSCE and the good offices of the UN
Secretary-General.[2] American sentiment was
first of all concerned with civil, political, and human rights. After the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, civil and political rights of ethnic
Georgians in Georgia were first of all abridged under Gamsakhurdia. Television
pictures of the Georgian repression of the Ossetian rebellion are what first
forced the U.S. to focus attention on the situation. Shevardnadze's arrival in
power brought unmatched prestige and attention to Georgia in the eyes of the
U.S. Partly because of his personal connections on the international stage, the
U.S. became most interested in his political success, which was defined to
include assuring the territorial integrity of the country since Shevardnadze's
political fate was tied to this.
However, the U.S. has been able to do little directly in
respect of the situation in Georgia. The U.S., through the institution of the
UN, made preparations in summer 1993 to dispatch military observers to the
Abkhazian theater, from which Shevardnadze, against much domestic opposition,
signed in late July an accord providing for ceasefire and removal of heavy
weaponry therefrom. In mid-September, after UN monitors began to arrive (one
Danish general in Sukhumi, the rest in Sochi), the ceasefire was massively
violated to the advantage of the Abkhaz, with strong evidence of complicity by
Russian military staff. The tripartite peacekeeping operation undertaken by
Georgian, Russian, and Abkhazian sides became a quadripartite Coordinating
Committee with the participation of the United Nations, and since then a
modus vivendi has been achieved where
[ page 135 ]
the status quo is the
basis for working toward a political settlement. In terms of a diplomatic
settlement, the United Nations has its good offices, but neither it nor the
CSCE nor NATO nor the EU nor any of the U.S. powers individually has been able
to influence the resolution of the situation. The May 1994 accord, motivated by
the UN, in fact legitimized the participation of Russian troops in certain
interim activities on the ground.
The U.S. participation has been largely limited to support
of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), whose original
mandate encompassed basic peace-keeping missions. However, after fighting broke
out in Abkhazia in September 1993, it was charged monitoring functions. After
the May 1994 agreement (Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces)
between Georgian and Abkhaz forces, UNOMIG’s tasks became to monitor and verify
its implementation, to observe the operation of the peacekeeping force of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and to accomplish various tactical
redeployments aimed at peace-maintaining. Ethnic Georgian refugees wish to
return to their previous places of residence in Abkhazia, and the CIS force is
unlikely to be able to protect them. This is one of the factors leading to the
stalemate between Tbilisi and Moscow over the renewal of the force's
mandate.
Because of the incomparable respect that Shevardnadze enjoys
in the U.S. foreign policy community, resulting from his tenure as Soviet
foreign minister, any serious threat to his rule would also draw Washington's
attention. Some observers believe that the planned oil pipeline across Georgia
to Supsa is at risk from terrorist attack, should hostilities become more
acute. Such a prospect could possibly bring the United States into a more
direct role in attempting to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia. Unless that
happens, the involvement of private American groups (including, for example,
economic interests) is likely to be of greater consequence than any direct U.S.
government initiative.
The conflict in Nagarno-Karabakh broke out when the Soviet
regime decided in 1988 to abolish local government there and institute direct
rule from Moscow through a Special Administration Committee. After seizing the
Azerbaijani town of Lachin, key to that corridor, Karabakh forces turned
northward, and seized and held the territory Kelbajar district, not in
Karabakh. This move abolished Karabakh's status as an enclave, attaching it to
the main body of Armenia; it also turned
[ page 136 ]
Karabakh into an aggressor in the eyes
of world public opinion. Russia's desire to maintain an appearance of droit
de regard in the Armenian-Azerbaijani region was manifest in its suspected
participation in the overthrow of Elchibey and elevation of Aliev to the
presidency of Azerbaijan. The latter reversed his predecessor’s policy of
keeping distance from Russia; soon after Aliev’s re-ascension (he had been
chief of the republic's Communist Party in the last days of the Soviet regime),
Azerbaijan's democratic movements were suppressed and its government declared
its desire to participate in the CIS. Arms from Russian commanders and soldiers
have fueled the conflict, and many observers are convinced that Russia turned
to help Armenia after having first favored Azerbaijan, whose troops and
officers soon began to receive training from Turkey after the Aliev restor a
tion.
The U.S.'s interests in Azerbaijan are geopolitical and
economic. Geopolitically, Armenia affords Russia a counterbalance to Azerbaijan
whenever the latter moves too close to Turkey, e.g., by its acceptance of a
Turkish proposal that Turkish observers participate in the UN peacekeeping
force soon to be dispatched to the Karabakh. The economic interests derive
mainly from the possibility further to develop Azerbaijan's petroleum resources
for export. This is also of interest to Russia, since the pipeline from Baku
crosses Russian territory on its way to Central Europe. The geopolitical
interests of the U.S. involve Azerbaijan's border with Iran, and her relations
with Turkey insofar as these latter affect Turkey's relations with Russia.
The Minsk contact group of the OSCE has served as a focal
point for multilateral consultations about Karabakh since the disintegration of
the Soviet state and the institutionalization of the CSCE as the OSCE, with
permanent secretariat and organs. These consultations were the basis for the
decision by the OSCE to deploy peacekeeping forces in Karabakh, at the same
time that Russia did not receive, either from the CIS Collective Security
Committee or from the United Nations, the mandate it sought to play that
role.
U.S. policy on Karabakh through much of the 1990s until the
present was dominated by the extremely well organized and politically well
connected Armenian diaspora. Legislation was passed that required a percentage
of U.S. aid go directly to Karabakh and which penalized both Azerbaijan and
Turkey for their bans on trade with Armenia. After several years, however, the
U.S. appointed a special representative for the Karabakh negotiations, with the
rank of ambassador. This represented an overt recognition of the vital nature
of American
[ page 137 ]
interests in the orderly functioning of oil and gas pipelines in
the region. Recently, the oil lobby in Washington has enlisted big political
guns from former Secretary of State (under Presidents Reagan and Bush) James
Baker to former National Security Advisor (under President Carter) Zbigniew
Brzezinski, in the increasingly successful initiative to reverse those policies
and establish a key relationship with Azerbaijan. President Heidar Aliev's
triumphant visit to the U.S. in early 1997 was the first and most significant
fruit of this démarche.
It is possible to distinguish two conceptions of security.
The first seeks to reduce the uncertainty in the international environment, by
“codifying” the changes that may be expected, thus making them predictable.
This first concept of security animated the Soviet initiative to convoke the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s.[3] The second seeks to establish or codify,
and to maintain unchanged, an existing status quo. Cooperative security is
oriented toward the first concept of security, of which the second concept is
in fact a reductive “null” case (in the sense of reducing permitted change to
zero). Cooperative security means, literally and etymologically, working
together for freedom from danger.[4] It is
to be distinguished from “security and cooperation.”
[ page 138 ]
The concept of cooperative security as originally developed
describes a dynamic process rather than a static situation. Indeed, the origin
of cooperative security appears to be the transparent overflights of emplaced
military forces in the region of the Suez Canal circa 1970, for the purpose of
verifying their disposition, thus enhancing security by decreasing the
uncertainty with respect to the adversary.[5] Cooperative security can be institutionalized but it
cannot reified.[6] Fundamental to the
implementation of cooperative security in Europe in the mid- and late 1980s
were the formulation and implementation of Confidence and Security Building
Measures (CSBMs). “Confidence” means having faith or trust, and “security”
means being without danger. Friends can have conflicts of interest, but the
threat of coercive force presupposes that at least one of the actors has an
Enemy image of its Other. An ongoing military conflict presupposes that both
parties hold an “Enemy” image of the Other.[7] Confidence in the Other’s intentions—a faithful
trust—is what changes the image of the Enemy; the consequence is that
oneself is less disposed to feel danger, i.e., oneself feels greater
security. Cooperative security, therefore, is cooperation for the
purpose of increasing security; as such, it is a process that depends upon
the activity of the cooperating participants. Cooperative security, though it
may therefore be an unending process but it is not an end in itself. Its goals
are security and cooperation, in that order: cooperation is impossible wit h
out security.
[ page 139 ]
“Engagement” implies cognition and promise, creating a realm
of the possible; but it stops short of the actual, hesitating to qualify
behavior as necessary. “Engagement” arises with the assertion that U.S. norms
(or at least desiderata) are applicable to Russia and the other NIS. In
ordinary language a “policy of engagement” announces concern but renounces
obligation, preserving action in a netherworld of potential and saying little
about goals. That the situation is fluid, justifies neither silence nor
vagueness about goals, which can be adjusted. So as not to be caught by this
ambiguity of ordinary language, it is instructive to rely upon the etymological
root of “engagement”: literally a “pledging in,” viz., a contractual (and/or
moral) guarantee, the forfeit of which entails penalty. Engagement for
cooperative security then means “pledging in” for measures, i.e., making
guarantees and promises, that contribute to abolishing danger, or a sense of
danger, by habituating parties to working together, thus promoting trust.[8]
Therefore engagement signifies the “pledging in” of
guarantees of which the forfeit entails penalty. If one is engaged to be
married, for example, then the expectation is that either the marriage will
take place or that the engagement will be broken off. What then is commitment?
“Commitment” is first of all reflexive: one commits oneself to
something, such as the realization of a project. To use metaphor from the
cardgame poker, “engagement” is the ante and “commitment” is playing the hand.
A player can “ante up” and later fold the hand, but only at the cost of losing
the original stake. If this is done often enough, however, the player ends up
bankrupt and out of the game altogether. To “pledge a guarantee” presumes
foreknowledge of the correlation between one’s own goals and the situation
pledged. The lack of well defined goals, accounts in part for the U.S.'s
inability to clarify the nature of its proclaimed “engagement” in the former
Soviet space. Of course the U.S.’s first interest is stability. The trouble is
that it frequently gives the impression of wanting something for nothing,
without always even being sure what that “something” is. Moreover, even
“regularized” disorder resembles stability. Yet engagement implies expectation.
In general such expectation involves a project in the root
etymological sense of something “thrown up or out,”
[ page 140 ]
in this case into the future.[9]
Commitment is literally “sending (out) with,” as with a
project; but it is still more basically an “entrusting” or a “delivering (of
oneself) over” to a projected future state of affairs. A commitment to a
project represents a promise, of which the etymological sense is:
something foretold or given hope of coming to pass; etymologically, “promise”
also signifies a “sending forth.” Therefore a commitment is an action, by
either word or deed, that promises the realization of a project implied by
engagement. Commitment is action that follows through upon previously signaled
intention. Insofar as actions are continually necessary to realize "cooperative
security," which is itself contextual and not static, cooperative security
itself is only a promise to be implemented through defined projects. But then
cooperative security, as such, implies more than engagement: it implies, its
very declaration as a goal even promises, commitment.
What does “cooperative security” require in the way of U.S.
commitments? In particular, is there is a “slippery slope,” where by interest
somehow naturally transformed into engagement, inevitably becoming
“commitment“? Not necessarily. There are in fact four possibilities:
1. Engagement may be neither practicable nor
required. In this case, there is no need for pro-active policy. There is
one instance of U.S. towards ethnic conflict in the Caucasus that exemplifies
this category. That is the U.S. (lack of) engagement in Chechnya, which was
limited to diplomatic protest a tions against human rights violations and
acquiescence in the revision of CFE interpretations to legitimize retroactively
the deployment of Russian military forces in the region, for which advance
notice was not given as required at the time.[10]
2. Engagement may be practicable yet not required.
In this case,
[ page 141 ]
policy must be designed according to what should and should not
be made possible. U.S. engagement in Abkhazia falls into this category. The
U.S. has operated multilaterally through the OSCE and the good offices of the
U.N. Secretary-General, even though this has meant accepting the emplacement of
a Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping force on the ground.
3. Engagement may be required yet not practicable.
In this case, policy must be designed first of all to make possible
what is necessary. Examples of policy instruments in this instance include
confidence- building measures and the provision of specific incentives for
specific actions. (For discussion, see next category.)
4. Engagement may be both practicable and required. In this case, policy must be designed to be non-self-limiting as to its
results, which is not the same as saying it should not have specific goals.
U.S. engagement in Karabakh falls into this categories. Indeed, it may be
argued that the Karabakh conflict originally fell into the third category
mentioned just above, where U.S. interests required engagement but engagement
was not practicable. Over time, the U.S. decided that engagement was so
required that it had to be made practicable, and appointment a special
envoy with the rank of ambassador to seek to catalyze a resolution to the
conflict in cooperation with other concerned international actors.
When military-strategic issues are key,
engagement moves from being neither required nor practicable, to being required yet not practicable; whence means are sought to make the engagement
practicable. When economic or legal-financial issues are key,
engagement moves from being not practicable to being practicable; and once
practicable, it tends to become required by the force of circu m stances.
Finally, when both military-strategic and economic/legal-financial
issues are both present, then ideological-political
issues are added.
If conflict exists, it may be conflict of interest, the
implicit or explicit threat of coercive force, or actual military operations.
All these conflict situations in the Caucasus today fall into the “implicit or explicit threat of coercive force” category. In such situations, cooperative security must seek to provide incentives to downgrade such crisis situations to conflicts of interest, rather than permit them to be upgraded to actual military conflict. This is where U.S. “engagement”—the provision of
guarantees—is relevant. In such situations, the goals of
cooperative security in respect of conflict may be
conflict-prevention, conflict-resolution, conflict-
[ page 142 ]
reduction, and/or conflict-management.
All instruments at the disposal of the United States are
either pure types or combinations of three aspects of international life:
financial-legal, economic, and military-strategic. (Actually there is also a
fourth, “political-cultural” instrument, which involves propagating and implementing norms of democratic participation and market-based competitive entrepreneurialism.) This list of instruments also represents a typology of American interests and of the issues that engage it in the NIS. The forms of conflict regulation just mentioned favor the deployment of economic and legal-financial instruments of policy. For U.S. politicians, such instruments are politically less costly, although their deployment is not altogether feasible in states whose governments do not fully control the territories over which they assert sovereignty.
Any given NIS can reflect the interests of its population
only to the degree that the polity is penetrated from the “bottom up” by the
basic elements of national power: human demography, economic geography, and the
ability to convert these into political resources. In general this “conversion
process” develops at different rates in different places, but nearly all states
in the region are at the mercy of their in ternational environment perhaps even
more than were the former colonies of the French and British Empires at the
time of their independence. There is indeed a race between the governments’
penetration of their own societies and their own penetration by the
international system; and the latter process is frequently at cross-purposes
with the former. There is some point at which the latter process, can become
politically destabilizing for the governments in the region themselves.
As the example of Russia itself shows, transnational
currency and financial relations are central. Microeconomic policy areas such
as privatization and price reform are linked to the creation of systems for
accounting law, property ownership, inheritance law, contract law, and
bankruptcy law; macroeconomic policy areas such as convertibility, currency
reform, and international borrowing are the development of foreign trade,
banking, and insurance systems. States in former Soviet space are ensembles of
national legal regimes which establish the interface between the national
economy (and society) of the individual state and the dominant norms of the
international political order. Within this framework,
[ page 143 ]
there are three policy
areas of special significance: coordination of foreign direct investment
(including the laws that govern it), macroeconomic stabilization, and currency
cooperation.
The United States has correctly recognized this as a general
phenomenon. Its quest for post-Soviet stability has focused on help to develop
not just the economic but also the financial stabilization in the Soviet
successor states. Thus it would be logical for the United States to support the
convocation of an Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus, as called for in
June at an international conference in Tbilisi. The Assembly’s own practical
work should be explicitly apolitical in the beginning, and concentrate on
humanitarian, health, and environment related issues. Private interests tend to
neglect such issues, as they do not bear the social cost of these.
For this, cooperation among nongovernmental organizations of
different countries of the region will be important. In that sphere Western
private voluntary organizations, as well as the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and various European Union organs, already play
an important role.
A separate proposal for a Common Market of the Caucasus (to
be extended later to include other countries of Eurasia), already well
developed, could also go ahead, specifically with backing for the proposed
regional investment bank at Tbilisi. This cooperation must be deepened, since
international private investment is targeted largely at energy exploration and
export and the states in the region do not at present have significant
autonomous fiscal resources. Even if the scale of such cooperation is
relatively modest, its successful pursuit would be a positive precedent at
least as important for the future, as any concrete results of such
cooperation.[11]
Such a démarche would be in line with current U.S.
policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott said on 21 July 1997 at a speech at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies, “We have been close partners with the major
international financial institutions” in seeking to resolve conflicts in the
Caucasus, because
[ page 144 ]
“there are obviously limits to what we can do ourselves.”[13] Yet the vitality of the
interests concerned is manifest even to the casual observer.
[ page 134 ]
[Note 1]. This “motive-belief” pattern
of inference is a natural mode of human reasoning. See, for instance, the
discussion of the “Logical Connection Argument” by Georg Henrik von Wright,
Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1971), pp. 93–97, 115–117, and nn.
[ page 137 ]
[Note 2]. For an excellent review OSCE
involvement in the Caucasus through early 1995, see Stephen Blank, “Russia, the
OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus,” Helsinki Monitor
6 (No. 3, 1995). See also Michael Mihalka, “A Marriage of
Convenience: The OSCE and Russia in Nagorny-Karabakh and Chechnya,”
ibid., 7 (No. 2, 1996).
[Note 3]. Robert Legvold, “The Problem
of European Security,” Problems of Communism 23, no.
1 (January–February 1974), pp. 1–24.
[Note 4]. The most significant early
work on cooperative security includes: John D. Steinbruner, “The Prospect of
Cooperative Security,” Brookings Review 7, no. 1
(Winter 1988–1989), pp. 53–62; Kurt Gottfried (ed.), Towards a
Cooperative Security Regime in Europe: A Report (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University, Peace Studies Program. 1989); Dora Alves (ed.), Cooperative
Security in the Pacific Basin: The 1988 Pacific Symposium (Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990); R. Mark Bean, Cooperative
Security in Northeast Asia: A China–Japan–South Korea Coalition
Approach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1990); Suzanne M.
Holroyd, U.S. and Canadian Cooperative Approaches to Arctic Security,
Note N–3111–RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, [1990]);
Building toward Middle East Peace: Working Group Reports from “Cooperative
Security In The Middle East,” Moscow, October 21–24, 1991, Policy
Paper 1 ([La Jolla, Calif.]: University of California, Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, [1992]); Ashton
[ page 138 ]
D. Carter, William J. Perry, and John
D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Occ a sional
Paper (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992); and Michael Krepon and
Amy E. Smithson (eds.), Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative
Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
[Note 5]. Amy E. Smithson, “Multilateral
Aerial Inspection: An Abbreviated History,” in Krepon and Smithson (eds.),
Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security, chap. 5.
[Note 6]. See the distinction between
“multilateral organizations” and “the institution of multilateralism,” in Lisa
L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism,” International
Organization 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), pp. 765–792.
[ page 139 ]
[Note 7]. The terminology is drawn from
the “operational code” literature. The article that established this as a
legitimate social-science technique is Alexander George, “The ‘Operational
Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision
Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2
(June 1969), pp. 190–222.
[ page 140 ]
[Note 8]. Compare “Strategy of Flexible
and Selective Engagement,” Defense Issues 10, no. 26
(March 1995), which is an Executive Summary of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1995).
[Note 9]. The interpretations laid
out in this paragraph and the next are built upon etymologies taken from the
Oxford English Dictionary.
[Note 10]. The present paper does not
address the Chechnya case in detail because of the lack of a pro-active
American policy seeking its resolution.
[ page 143 ]
[Note 11]. Robert Cutler, “A Strategy
for Cooperative Energy Security in the Caucasus,” Caspian Crossroads
3, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 23-29.
[Note 12]. Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and
Central Asia” (Address at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, 21 July 1997).
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