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| Abstract: This article comprehensively develops the concept of cooperative energy security as an empirical category of analysis having normative content. The three necessary components of cooperative energy security are an investment-friendly financial climate, guarantees of secure transport, and political stability. This concept is a progressive development of recent research into the sources of effective international environmental protection. It provides an entry-point for a rapprochement of the international environmental agenda with the international energy agenda. It has resonances with the study of multilateralism and learning in international affairs, and these are made explicit. The concept is applied to the substantive policy arena of the Caspian region, demonstrating its utility and vitality. An analytical review of events in the Caspian region since 1991 through the end of 1998 (date of the article's final redaction) reveals three principal problems in Caspian energy development that give rise to three lessons. These lessons are in fact representative examples from distinct categories of desiderata. Previous research on the effectiveness of international environmental institutions has already elaborated those categories. These environmental categories represent the "three Cs" (contract, concern, and capacity) that enhance the effectiveness of international environmental institutions. | This article is full text. Contents: |
| Suggested citation for this webpage: Robert M. Cutler, “Cooperative Energy Security in the Caspian Region: A New Paradigm for Sustainable Development?” Global Governance 5, no. 2 (April–June 1999): 251–271, available at ⟨http://www.robertcutler.org/CES/html/ar99gg.html⟩, accessed 15 November 2024. | |
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After the 1973–74 oil embargo, it became impossible to maintain that issues of economic dependence and interdependence were irrelevant to the international security agenda. As that agenda expanded, it slowly rendered obsolete the exclusively military-strategic notions that led international regions to be treated as pawns on a bipolar chessboard. The phoenix-like cry of renascent rivalry between the nuclear superpowers in the early 1980s, was only the swan song of Cold War strategic bipolarity. Today it is still true that guarantee of access to reasonably priced, predictable energy supplies depends upon the politics of global geo-economics. Yet in the post–Cold War era, these politics differ entirely from those of any previous international system.
Today international regions are not what they used to be; and in comparison with the Cold War system, they enjoy an increased relative autonomy of great-power conflict. The end of bipolarity does not by itself account for this: much more central and crucial is that the post–Cold War system has become a complex system, a self-organizing network rather than a top-down hierarchy. This more essential difference developed over the last quarter-century under the cover of bipolarity and has now emerged. Distinctions among superpowers, great powers, and regional powers have hardly disappeared, but middle-range and lower-level phenomena have become the predominant motive forces in an international system that now self-organizes from bottom up.[1]
The end of the bipolar Cold War system has made likewise manifest the salience of new categories of international regions whose significance is today irrefutable. A most strikingly evident development is that littoral basins in particular have become central foci for international action on the regional and systemic levels. The emergence of such issue areas of international public policy as ecological security, pollution control, and the regularization of waterborne trade is but one indicator of this general movement toward nontraditional security regimes in regional international systems at large. Still more striking, regional international systems, despite
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their increased relative autonomy of systemic control, are more and more strongly linked together among themselves.[2]
Responding to this new situation, I develop the concept of cooperative energy security as an empirical category of analysis that has normative content. This concept motivates a rapprochement between the international energy agenda and the international environmental agenda. A connection between these two agendas is manifest in certain limited policy communities yet not in evidence in the scholarly literature. This concept resonates with the study of multilateralism and learning in international affairs. The substantive policy arena to which I apply the concept here, demonstrating its utility and vitality, is the circum-Caspian region narrowly construed, with implications for Europe and Eurasia more generally. One result of the application is to undergird conceptually a new and unique international public policy initiative in this field, which I discuss briefly below and elaborate in greater detail elsewhere.
Cooperative security has lately been identified as a grand strategy for the United States after the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980s it was systematically applied to only regional security. The present application of the concept of cooperative security to the energy issue area is based on that original regional concept.[3] Cooperative energy security has three aspects: (1) its relation to pragmatically-oriented research literature on learning and multilateralism; (2) its actual components and their significance; and (3) its catalytic potential for bringing together, both theoretically and in practice, the international energy and environmental agendas. Let us treat these aspects consecutively.
The seminal instance of cooperative security appears to be the accord to allow transparent overflights of emplaced military forces in the region of the Suez Canal circa 1970. Those overflights served to verify the disposition of opposing Israeli and Egyptian forces, giving the two sides an intersubjectively shared international environment and the means to reduce the ambiguity in that environment.[4] Cooperative security’s original purpose was therefore not to eliminate threat altogether, but to manage it by motivating the opposing parties to work together. The process enhanced security by decreasing the adversaries’ uncertainty with respect to each other. The concept of cooperative security thus lay implicitly behind the formulation and implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Europe in the mid and late 1980s. It therefore differs from the security
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and cooperation approach embodied in the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) of the 1970s, of which the final document sought to codify what changes in the status quo were permissible. Cooperative security merely seeks to manage perceived threat by making such changes predictable without specifying them exhaustively.[5]
The significance of this subtle difference is that cooperative security emphasizes not only the reciprocity among those who cooperate but also the interpenetration of their cognitive sets and the reciprocal recognition of that interpenetration. It is therefore a pragmatically based, policy-oriented specification of learning in international affairs. As such, it goes beyond earlier formulations such as the “tit-for-tat” strategy and the “Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction” (GRIT) theory.[6] It is a process that occurs principally with reference to the common action and shared consciousness of the cooperating participants, rather than principally with reference to a given status quo.
As the concept of cooperative energy security requires international cooperation, so also in a “complex” system it implies multiple agency and hence multilateralism. It emphasizes that agents and actors can alter shared context, thereby motivating cooperative developments more profoundly than any mechanistic stimulus-response focus on bilateral instruments can allow. In this, it is consonant with recent advances in sociological network analysis, which has conclusively demonstrated, for example, that the dynamics within a triad differ qualitatively from the aggregated dynamics of all dyads within the triad.[7] As such, its cognitive component requires transcendence of the operational-code methodology, which posits a dichotomous self/other ontology and constructs from this a Manichæan epistemology. The construct of “integrative complexity” is a step in that direction.[8]
The three necessary components of cooperative energy security are an investment-friendly financial climate, guarantees of secure transport, and political stability.[9] These are not together sufficient to provide cooperative energy security, which allows the extraction of resources and their transit to market for the benefit of all parties. However, they are necessary for such resources to be extracted and marketed and for such benefits to accrue.
These components represent transparencies of the three classical economic factors of production: land, capital, and labor. First, the provision of secure transport means the transparency of land—which signifies geographical distance and therefore includes bodies of water—simply because transport occurs through and over land. Second, the transparency of capital signifies a similar absence of obstacles to foreign direct investment as it moves through the host country’s domestic legal and financial regimes,
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which must be conducive to those flows and tailored to such a purpose. Third, the transparency of labor signifies political stability, without which there is no labor market: that is, without political stability, individuals do not have the necessary incentive structure to manifest socially as an aggregate labor force. It is worthwhile to devote a few additional remarks to this last transparency.
In the absence of guarantees provided by political order against private coercion, individuals are preoccupied with their own physical safety and that of their families. Their economic activity is dominated by the acquisition of the means of subsistence and other basic goods for personal consumption, often through unmonetized or incompletely monetized channels. However, such exchanges should not be mistaken for a market—unless it is considered a market when, in return for another’s guarantee of one’s own short-term personal security (that is, not being immediately shot), one barters (that is, turns over at the point of a gun) one’s own economic goods needed by the other (for example, food) in exchange for one’s own immediate needs (that is, short-term guarantees of physical survival) on a regular basis.
This is no hyperbole. In the northern Caucasus today, physical persons have become commodities to be appropriated (that is, kidnapped) and sold (that is, ransomed), and this occurs on a regular basis. Such a state of affairs expresses nothing other than the logic of the privatization of that public good called political order. If such extralegal appropriations go unpunished and become a regular characteristic rather than an aberration, then they inhibit the creation of monetized markets. Yet monetized markets are a prerequisite for the efficient use of foreign direct investment of capital.[10]
The concept of cooperative energy security is also a progressive development of recent research into the sources of effective international environmental protection.[11] It provides an entry point for motivating the integration of the international environmental agenda with the international energy agenda. The international public policy initiative to establish a EurAsian Oil and Gas Association (EAOGA) represents a focus demonstrating the vitality of the analysis.[12] In a self-organizing complex system such as the present-day international system, the task of policy analysis is to identify crucial intermediate points where cognitive and organizational intervention will instantiate large-scale restructuring of the system itself. For this reason, EAOGA is not a supranational organization and not even necessarily a traditional international organization.
Towards the end of this manuscript, I explain how the EAOGA initiative integrates all of the three Cs identified as “paths to effectiveness” that international environmental institutions may promote: an increase in governmental
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concern, the enhancement of the contractual environment, and the building of national capacity.[13] I show that the principal problems in Caspian energy development fall into categories that implementation of the three Cs can help resolve. I set the stage for this in the next two sections. In the first of these, I show how the post–Cold War international system manifests essential differences from previous international systems. I do so by painting the dynamics of the Caucasus and circum-Caspian regional international system against the broader tableau of the emerging Caspian/Black Sea metaregion in international politics. In the subsequent section, I summarize the problems that stand in the way of successful development of Caspian energy resources, and I transform those problems into lessons that can be applied to overcome the actual obstacles.
The emergence of new issues onto the international political agenda has made littoral basins the foci of cooperative initiatives in areas of nontraditional security. Littoral basins in general and the circum-Caspian region in particular have not acquired such a high profile because the littoral countries seek this. Rather, this has occurred because the international political agenda requires multilateral cooperation for problems that are not zero-sum. At the same time as the Caspian region’s relative autonomy of systemic factors is enhanced, it is linked indissolubly with adjacent littoral regions, notably the Black Sea. Indeed, the entire metaregion from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and beyond, including all their littoral states from the Balkans through Central Asia, has become the focus of new sets of international and transnational networks of interdependence.[14]
The Caspian/Black Sea metaregion emerges as a focus for relationships previously conceived under rubric of Southwest Asia. The disintegration of Cold War era state boundaries dissolves the apparent integrity of Southwest Asia. This category first gained prominence only in the early 1980s, as the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in response to perceived regional threats, domestic political and bureaucratic demands, and the dissolution of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) soon after the Iranian revolution. Southwest Asia is still a useful geographical rubric; but the region was never a cultural, economic, or political unity; and the term can be only descriptive, not analytical. Nevertheless, a general entente is emerging among the so-called Northern Tier, itself also a geopolitical concept inherited from Western strategy during the Cold War. The new Northern Tier extends from Turkey in a crescent
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east-northeast through Kazakhstan. It is surviving the disintegration of the Soviet Union even though it is based on an artifact of the West’s Cold War strategy, because many of its members have decided to maintain and extend it in their own interests.[15]
The best way to begin to make quick sense of so overwhelmingly complex a situation is to classify the interested countries according to what they most offer: resources, transport, or capital and technology. Resource-holders are countries that have only energy resources and must rely on others both for transport to market and for investment capital. These countries are principally Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Countries such as Russia and Iran have energy resources, but their occupation of territory that resource-holders need for transit to market is more important in this analysis. Transport-holders therefore include not only Russia and Iran but also Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and potentially Armenia. Finally we may call capital-and-technology-holders those actors that can offer capital and technology but which are neither resource-holders nor transport-holders; in this case, that means the United States and the European Union (EU) member states. To those may be added the EU itself and perhaps other nonstate actors such as certain international financial institutions as well as the international energy companies themselves.
From a complex-system perspective, the major regional players who do most to contextualize the situation and influence its evolution (without controlling it) are the middle-level powers. Here they all happen to be transport-holders: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. From both a theoretical and a practical standpoint, therefore, it makes sense to review very briefly how these three players have interacted over the last decade. The purpose of the exercise is to identify some microlevel phenomena that may be, or have been, key in catalyzing critical developments on a larger scale.
In the late 1980s President Turgut Özal of Turkey saw his country in competition for influence with Iran in Central Asia and with Russia in the Caucasus. Even before the U.S.S.R. began to disintegrate, he promoted the foundation of Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC). In the early 1990s it was widely thought that this initiative, together with a certain cultural history, would make Turkey the dominant regional power in Central Asia. Western assessments of Central Asia in the early 1990s tended to emphasize the competition between Iran and Turkey, ignoring Russia. The West believed Iran to be a serious threat in Central Asia and hoped Turkey’s secular political order would be a model of political development there. However, Özal died and no one in Turkey could replace his strategic vision. Furthermore, Turkey’s inability to provide truly large amounts of investment capital led to her discrediting as a viable development alternative in the eyes of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Central Asian countries, disappointed with Turkey as “older brother,” turned to other sources.[16]
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That political disappointment has led to the projection of influence not only by Iran, but also by China, in addition to Russia. Iran originally feared that the OBSEC initiative would inaugurate a Turkish push for economic expansionism. It sought a counterweight by re-invigorating the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). ECO’s weak institutional development does not signify a failure to establish regional networks of interdependence. The idea to pipe Turkmenistan’s gas to Europe through Iran was born at an ECO summit. The organization has also promoted communication and consultation. These contacts have indeed facilitated the projection of limited economic power, through an aggregate of smaller-scale projects, by Turkey, the only ECO country that really has any significant capital available for foreign direct investment. Therefore, Iran’s involvement in ECO hardly leads Turkey to oppose it. Indeed, in the West, ECO is sometimes seen as a counterweight to Arab economic influence in the Islamic world.[17]
According to President Yeltsin, Russia saw its interest as playing the balance in the southern Caucasus through most of the 1990s, to prevent other powers from asserting themselves.[18] Iranian diplomacy in the south Caucasus was pro-Armenian in the beginning; Russia saw this as an important counterbalance to the increasing role of Turkey. However, when Iran began to show greater interest in Central Asia, however, Russia invited Turkey to participate in settling the Karabakh problem. There is very strong circumstantial evidence that Russia (or at least its military and security apparatus) was involved in the extended mid-1993 governmental crisis in Azerbaijan, in which the former communist Aliev replaced Elchibey. This outcome meant to maintain instability, not to resolve it. The earlier domestic turmoil in Azerbaijan, which many believe was stoked by Russia to prevent either Turkey or Iran from consolidating any influence, delayed the development of Baku’s oil industry, impoverishing its foreign exchange.[19]
Had the Karabakh conflict been settled in the early 1990s, Azerbaijan would have endorsed a pipeline through Armenia to get to Turkey, thereby ensuring that its own exclave of Nakhichevan (which borders eastern Turkey) received sufficient energy supplies. During the long wait, however, Baku was able to make other arrangements for Nakhichevan and no longer considers the route through Armenia necessary for that reason. It remains nevertheless Azerbaijan’s most natural and economical oil export route. Turkey does not like routes via Russia or Georgia to the Black Sea because these would overwhelm its crowded Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. Therefore, in March 1993, the oil minister of Azerbaijan’s President Elchibey began talks in Ankara concentrating on a proposal to pipe
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oil to Ceyhan, the Turkish port on the east Mediterranean. Azerbaijan’s current president, Heydar Aliev—on coming to power in an extended coup d’état lasting throughout summer 1993—renegotiated Elchibey’s agreement with Turkey, obtaining terms more favorable. By then the Armenian route for Baku’s oil did not seem realistic, and a project for it to be sent to the Mediterranean through Iran and Turkey was worked out. American objections later led to Iran’s exclusion.[20]
Turkey hesitated to endorse Aliev at first but, assuming that Aliev thought he needed Turkish aid more than Russian or even American help, finally signaled its support for him in October 1993. The very next month Russia’s energy minister, Shafranik, made a secret visit to Baku, where he signed agreements for shipment of Azerbaijan’s oil through Russian territory.[21] But the pipeline to Novorossiisk still needs more investment than Shafranik told Aliev it did; also there are other significant logistical and geophysical complications. The 1993 agreements with Russia alone would represent an opportunity cost to Azerbaijan of three-quarters of a billion dollars annually. A highly unusual editorial, published without a signature by the official Azerbaijani press agency in early 1994, was sharply critical of the Baku government on precisely this point: “But despite this big sum, the majority of Azeris are sure that we can pay it to put an end to the war [with Armenia] as soon as possible. Yet there remains one matter: will Russia really settle the Karabakh matter in favor of Azerbaijan?”[22] Russia did not (and has not done so since).
Consequently, in 1994, Aliev engaged Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in discussions not only to increase Turkey’s input into a solution of the Karabakh conflict but also to determine the feasibility of an oil pipeline for the export of Azerbaijan’s oil through eastern Turkey to the Mediterranean. Russia officially stated its interest in “cooperating” with Turkey on Caucasus/Caspian oil but still assumed that the Novorossiisk route would be the first one implemented. This expectation was concretized in a pipeline plan agreed in mid-January 1995 by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (established by Russian, Kazakhstani and Omani companies, basically behind the back of U.S.-based Chevron) for Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani oil to go across southern Russia to Novorossiisk. By then, however, military conflict in Chechnya made arguments for a Caucasus route for the oil much less plausible because a main segment of the pipeline went through Grozny, the Chechen capital.[23]
Still, by the end of January 1995, Turkey was trumpeting that it had won U.S. support for a competing route for oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan on the eastern Mediterranean Turkish coast. Mid-February 1995 was a crucial time for these questions. Yet another deadline that the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC, the multinational consortium) had set itself for a pipeline decision was about to pass without effect. In this context, there resurfaced the question of participation by
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Iran, which, over vigorous objections from the United States, was then on the verge of acquiring an interest in the Azerbaijan consortium. With negotiations about an Armenian route still deadlocked over Karabakh, Russia’s first deputy foreign affairs minister Albert Chernishev (former Soviet ambassador to Ankara for much of the 1980s and early 1990s) proposed that Turkey and Russia cooperate on the transport of both Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani petroleum. He specifically admitted the principle of two export pipelines, one through Russia and the other through Turkey. He affirmed that U.S. support for the Turkish route “absolutely” did not bother Russia if security issues could be solved. He significantly added that Russia was “content” with Turkey’s stance on the “Chechen problem” and did not itself support Kurd separatists in Turkey.[24]
Still, in mid-February 1995, the head of British Petroleum (holder of one of the largest stakes in the Azerbaijan consortium) had talks with President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia on the possibility of the pipeline passing through his country into Turkey. Shevardnadze welcomed the project for domestic economic and international diplomatic reasons.[25] Although Aliev regarded Georgia as the most chaotic place in the Caucasus because of its own ethnic tensions (Ossetia and Abkhazia, and potentially Ajaria and Javakhetia), the two leaders quickly discovered that they shared the sense of Russian responsibility for many of their most acute ethnic troubles. In the absence of success in the negotiations with Armenia, and in the presence of a U.S. veto on Iran along with the Western insistence for a second route in addition to the Russian one to Novorossiisk, the Georgian route into Turkey was ultimately selected with Russian acquiescence.
Three principal problems are evident from the foregoing analytical narrative. These are: (1) transnational corporations (TNCs) cannot do it alone, (2) diktats fail, and (3) intragovernmental politics do not always help. However, these three problems give rise to lessons which in turn indicate antidotes. First the problems have to be briefly elaborated.
Problem 1. TNCs cannot do it alone. Chevron had for years been powerless against Russian delays in pursuing the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project for construction of a pipeline from northwest Kazakhstan across southern Russia to the Black Sea. The United States has been an important player, but Kazakhstani officials complained early on that the Bush Administration was pressuring them to sign with Chevron as a condition for bilateral economic assistance. If this is true, Kazakhstan’s subsequent lack
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of sympathy for Chevron’s protests over the Caspian pipeline to Novorossiisk becomes understandable. One part of the differences between Chevron and Kazakhstan, which nearly led Nazarbaev to cancel the deal and open bidding on the project to other western oil companies, concerned social infrastructure. TNCs create massive social costs that political institutions must cover; however, they are also the only major source for investment in the social infrastructure necessary to ensure the political stability that comes from balanced development. Chevron has not eased its own relations with Kazakhstan in this respect. Out of the $1.5 billion investment projected in the first three years, Chevron balked at allocating more than $50 million for hospitals, schools and the like. By contrast, the AIOC has since then built and opened hospitals in Azerbaijan.[26]
Problem 2. Diktats fail. The fate of the Russian strategy for Eurasian energy development throughout most of the 1990s highlights a signal feature of the post–Cold War international system as a “complex system”: coercive unilateralism loses. Russia has given the indelible impression of demanding both a political veto and an economic interest in any project. Russia could have done much more than it did, for example, to see that CPC construction at least got started. Perhaps Russia worried that development of Kazakhstani resources would threaten Russia’s own share of the world market. Moscow had hoped control over access to export pipelines would have been its trump card in controlling how Central Asian resources were developed. However, Russian attempts to retard energy development by others has only led to the development of alternative transport routes for energy supplies to market. Attempts to control pipeline development in the Caucasus motivated the so-called “GUAM” (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) entente to create a transport corridor excluding Russia. Turkmenistan expects to let Russian companies into offshore gas development in exchange for diplomatic peace.[27]
Problem 3. Intragovernmental politics do not always help. Political conflicts within Russia itself, among the oil and gas bureaucracies, have wasted scarce institutional and economic resources and inhibited the transnational coordination of investment and development policies. For example, in the mid-1990s, an earlier expansion of the Russian company Lukoil’s stake in the Azerbaijan consortium had brought some support from the Russian fuel and energy ministry, as well perhaps from the Russian prime minister personally. But people in President Yeltsin’s office, sections of the foreign ministry, the whole defense ministry, and much of the Duma continued to regard the Caspian as a Russian lake. Russia’s control of the territory for transit has given rise also to conflicts of interest within the former Soviet republics themselves. Delays in developing the oil industry in Azerbaijan in particular are significantly due to political instability stoked by Russia in order to prevent either Turkey or Iran from consolidating any influence in the region.[28]
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Neither Russia nor the non-Russian newly independent states (NIS), nor any energy development consortium nor the West, can solve a single one of these three problems by itself. What is necessary is sustained political engagement by the international community in cooperation with these other actors. The international community has provided large amounts of purely economic assistance to Russia and the other NIS, but this is of the Band-Aid variety and is unmotivated by a clear vision of ultimate purpose. The concept of cooperative energy security provides a focus for such a vision. Contrast between the AIOC and CPC consortia is the lens providing that focus, resolving problems into lessons. How to apply those lessons will then become evident from their discussion.
Lesson 1. TNCs need help and know it. Moreover, the technical problems of constructing the pipelines are inseparable from the political issues of who will build and control the pipelines, who will finance and manage them, and where will they be built. The nature and variety of technical and geophysical obstacles require pooling of financial resources and transport facilities. The complexity of the technical problems in the Tengiz venture has already required new forms of organization and decisionmaking.[29] Existing political and economic structures and incentives are just as outdated as old methods of business operation. These have involved the application of specialized knowledge to fields as different but integrated as enterprise management, political engineering, and financial settlement.
Lesson 2. States need more information and better evaluation of it. The CPC was also a victim of its own problems. Significant among these was the tendency for its chief to try to run things with minimal consultation.[30] If we are in the presence of a “complex system,” then it is rather clear that this should fail. The AIOC’s relative success, as I describe below, seems to confirm the insight. States have to seek more information and evaluate it properly, because in the post–Cold War international system there is no holding back the free flow of information or in the end any holding back the ability of people to act on that information. In the case of the AIOC, Azerbaijani citizens trained in both environmental science and energy development have contributed to the integration of these concerns on the ground. The AIOC is not, properly speaking, a transnational consortium but a truly multinational one, in the sociological sense that its leadership team and their deputies come from a variety of national backgrounds.[31] The practical consequence of this variety is to alter the decisionmaking culture. The involvement of citizens of the resource-holding country represents a type of at least virtual participation in policymaking by the host country’s citizenry. It is related to the model of the small European countries such as the Netherlands, where specialized public interest groups
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have long cooperated with ministries for the practical resolution of policy questions, irrespective of legislative intervention.[32] The AIOC example illustrates how private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations can, through intermediaries, work informally with governments. By contrast, for a long time the CPC had not encouraged even informal consultations of this sort in decisionmaking on energy development.
Lesson 3. Human resources must be better integrated into the policy process. Indeed, enhanced citizen participation is necessary, for in the Caspian region these publics are increasingly literate, increasingly informed, and increasingly politically active.[33] The incorporation of citizen participation into the political process therefore does not contradict, but can only guarantee, the successful development and marketing of Caspian energy resources. The only people capable of implementing this will be those who will have learned to think and act independently, thanks to previous opportunities for greater initiative. Moreover, foreign investors increasingly recognize that their own economic interest requires the emergence of an experienced younger generation that will be capable of taking over greater responsibility and carrying on the work of the present-day leaders later in the twenty-first century. This is in the medium-term and long-term interest of the governments and consortia, because, as the new international system organizes itself from the bottom up, the newly independent states need people who can respond appropriately to new and unexpected challenges and quickly and efficiently adapt policies and strategies to changing circumstances. Again the experience of the AIOC with its host countries provides an evident example of this.
The three problems I identify above come together and are expressed in the fact, that the current and still dominant modus operandi among all state and most nonstate the actors has been to treat pipeline routes not as the essential necessity that they are, but rather as inducements to sign contracts that are bought where possible and extorted by political pressure where necessary. That is why until now the decisions that have been made have been so poor and why those who make them seem unable to learn from their mistakes. As mentioned, the AIOC-CPC contrast turns these problems into lessons.
To review, the lessons are: (1) that TNCs need help and any executive with any hope of surviving knows it, (2) that states need more information and better ways to evaluate it, and (3) that the broader human resources in the region need to be better integrated into the policy process. These are not the only lessons to be drawn from the entire tableau of Caspian energy development. They are only the ones most evident from the brief analytical narrative given above. They are in fact representative examples from
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distinct categories of desiderata. Previous research on the effectiveness of international environmental institutions has already elaborated those categories:
These three environmental lessons, each of which has there is a Caspian energy analogue, represent the three Cs (contract, concern, and capacity) that enhance the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.[34] As promised at the outset of this article, they motivate the integration of the international environmental agenda with the international energy agenda. The concept of cooperative energy security focuses that integration, and the analysis has applied it to the Caspian region. The first energy lesson responds to the needs of transnational corporations and their consortia, and it promotes transparency of capital. The second responds to the needs of states in and outside the region, and it promotes transparency of land. The third responds to the needs of populations in the region, and it promotes transparency of labor as well as civil society. Combining these lessons in practice would offer something to everyone. If all this is so obvious, then why are things still in a mess? As is so often the case in international affairs, this is because there has been no effective catalyst.
International institutions and regimes have in the past provided such catalysts. In fact, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, all the necessary elements are in place, save the catalyst. I have proposed to establish a EurAsian Oil and Gas Association (EAOGA) to promote the catalysis, possibly (but not necessarily) beginning with a limited series of international conferences structured as a set of coordinating conferences and technical assistance working groups, like the 1992 international conferences on assistance to the NIS after the Soviet Union fell apart.[35] How well do my specifications fit the above analysis?
1. Enhancing the contractual environment. As I state at the outset, EAOGA would not create an international bureaucracy or supranational
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authority. It would be normatively based on the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), an already existing international agreement that has recently entered into force.[36] This treaty’s principal political goals are to trade Western capital and technology for NIS energy, diminish Europe’s dependence on OPEC, and encourage post-Soviet reform by promoting free trade and ensuring access to resources. Its main legal objective is to guarantee nondiscrimination and transparency in the application of international norms to industrial and commercial property. Its chief economic aim is to establish conditions for a functioning energy market by mobilizing the private sector through intergovernmentally established incentives. The oil companies support it in particular because it promises them the stable business environment they need to proceed with productive economic activity.[37] An ECT-based EAOGA would enhance the contractual environment.
2. Increasing governmental concern. It seems likewise the case that EAOGA would help increase governmental concern. The U.S. government and the international oil industry support ECT because it provides a stable financial environment for business investment. The United States supports it because it offers a low-cost way (in terms of taxpayer dollars) to help the NIS economies to rebuild, and it gives Europe a source of natural gas and oil other than North Africa and the Persian Gulf. EAOGA can provide a tool for implementing ECT principles among participants who wish to cooperate on ECT’s basis. That would help to link issues and distribute knowledge, which is what increasing governmental concern is about. In view of this, a new international financial institution, lean and mean, is worth considering. Such a EaogaBank would not be just another international development bank. Like the Bank for International Settlements, originally founded after the World War I to track German reparations payments, this new institution would not have to be a bank per se, nor would it have to have executive authority. Its focal task (a crucial one that no one currently performs) might be to track payments and financial arrangements for oil and gas development in the NIS. It could also enforce operational discipline upon NIS banks if it were given authority to grant an international certification or accreditation for oil and gas development.[38]
3. Building national capacity. ECT invokes Western norms of international law and calls on Russia and the other NIS, who have all signed it, to harmonize their energy investment and their tax systems with those norms. Thus EAOGA could go still further through EaogaBank, promoting national systems of banking, finance, and legislation that dovetail with international requirements for investment in the energy sector. Moreover, it could organize research on NIS macroeconomic coordination, since a barter system has made a comeback in accounts settlements among the NIS. Yet payments issues are not ad hoc problems; they reflect recurrent structural disequilibria needing systematic attention.[39] They are the tip of an iceberg of financial instability that threatens the viability of economic
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programs in the region, thus the living standard of the populations there, hence the social stability of the governments in themselves, thereby the political security of export routes, and so ultimately the success of any energy development plans.
EAOGA would merely be the catalyst to establish the rules of the game, create the general framework necessary for cooperation, coordinate crisis management, define criteria for the various sides’ behavior, and provide stable expectations for routine commercial and political transactions. The EaogaBank could also be an independent center for analytical studies, capable of evaluating objectively the experiences of different organizations. This scientific-research center would legitimately draw attention to environmental problems, because assuring the quality of life among all social strata of all countries participating in EAOGA is itself a necessary guarantee of political and social stability. EAOGA is possible either with or without Russia. Non-Russian fears that such an organization could become a CIS superministry can be assuaged through specific Western participation and international oversight. Russian fears of loss of control of CIS space can be answered by observing that Russia’s participation will enhance its relations with its neighbors. EAOGA would help assure to the TNCs, and in concert with them, the political stability that the latter require for their own projects to succeed.[40]
New international regions have become complex systems composed of interdependent elements. Although in great flux, these systems remain fundamental realities based on sociological and natural facts. Those realities identify the sources of potential future conflicts: they are demographic and geographic. The median age of the population in central and southwest Asia is in the low twenties; a demographic explosion accompanying the demographic transition is inevitable. The population of the crescent of countries from Turkey through Kazakhstan, already over a third of a billion, will double in the next quarter-century. To this demographic fact, add geographic facts: there is already not enough water, whether for drinking or for agriculture, and there is little uncultivated arable land on which to raise more food for new mouths. People have already started migrating to the cities. If they follow the economic and social pattern of Iran in the 1970s, they will likely become a lumpenized mass. The economic fact is that an average annual growth rate of 5% would be necessary in the GNP to cope with the demographic explosion, but current GNP is at best slightly declining.[41]
Research on the international environmental agenda shows how the international community can succeed at this through multilateral cooperative
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institutions, a project at which the aggregation of bilateral state-to-state relations fails. The EAOGA proposal suggests how to apply this insight proactively to the international energy agenda. Embodying the concept of cooperative energy security, an institution such as EAOGA can motivate a synergistic and pragmatic rapprochement of the international energy agenda with the international environmental agenda. Indeed, the concept of sustainable development holds good potential to integrate the international energy and environment agendas.[42]
One way to look at EAOGA is to see it, like the European Coal and Steel Community, as dedicated to the management of strategic natural resource development after the end of a war (the Cold War); but it would be an institution adapted to the complex system of international relations of the twenty-first century. Such an institution as EAOGA would legitimize international involvement in managing conflict over resource development in a comprehensive manner heretofore absent. The global community cannot deal with these issues ad hoc. An international, transnational, and multinational coalition having a strategic multifaceted perspective seems necessary. Such a dedicated association of governmental, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations would rally all levels of international society in order to safeguard cooperatively their own economic security with respect to energy projects.[43]
Drawing on recent work on global governance and multilateral cooperation in the environmental issue area, EAOGA-motivated research can integrate these with the global society variant of multilateralist theory and provide further impetus to the resolution of the pertinent problems in practice. On a theoretical level, it would be a crucial test case both for those who argue that minimal levels of self-evolving cooperation are sufficient to promote international security coordination, and for those who argue that multilateral frameworks for international public policy are necessary to manage geo-economic conflict. On a more fundamental level, of course, the initiative’s significance transcends theory and the region itself to embrace the global economy and its future.
[Note 1]. On the complex-system approach to social systems, see: Yaneer Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), chaps.
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8–9; A. Gierer, “Systems Aspects of Socio-economic Inequalities in Relation to Developmental Strategies,” in R. Felix Geyer and Johannes van der Zouwen, eds., Dependence and Inequality: A Systems Approach to the Problems of Mexico and Other Developing Countries (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 23–34; Paul A. Stokes, “Socio-Cybernetics and the Project of Scientificization of Sociology,” in Francis Heylighen, Eric Rosseel, and Frank Demeyere, eds., Self-Steering and Cognition in Complex Systems: Towards a New Cybernetics (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1990), pp. 311–334; B. Weber, “Implications of the Application of Complex Systems Theory to Ecosystems,” in R. Felix Geyer, ed., The Cybernetics of Complex Systems: Self-Organization, Evolution, Social Change (Salinas, Calif.: Intersystems Publications, 1993), pp. 21–30.
[Note 2]. Showing interesting prescience is Karl Kaiser, “The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers,” World Politics 21 (October 1968): 84–107, esp. 90–91, 100–105. Compare other research from the Cold War era: Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, “International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (December 1969): 361–380; and William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly 17 (March 1973): 89–117. But the empirically based conclusions of Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” American Political Science Review 64 (March 1970): 98–123, appear still valid.
[Note 3]. On cooperative security as grand strategy: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/7): 5–53. On cooperative security in regional frameworks: Dora Alves, ed., Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin: The 1988 Pacific Symposium (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990); R. Mark Bean, Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia: A China-Japan-South Korea Coalition Approach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1990); Kurt Gottfried, ed., Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe: A Report (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Peace Studies Program, 1989); Suzanne M. Holroyd, U.S. and Canadian Cooperative Approaches to Arctic Security, Note N–3111–RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1990); Building toward Middle East Peace: Working Group Reports from “Cooperative Security in the Middle East,” Moscow, October 21–24, 1991, Policy Paper 1 (La Jolla, Calif.: University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1992).
[Note 4]. Amy E. Smithson, “Multilateral Aerial Inspection: An Abbreviated History,” in Michel Krepon and Amy E. Smithson, eds., Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), chap. 5.
[Note 5]. On CSCE, see Victor-Yves Ghébali, “Les dix principes d’Helsinki: Interprétations et mise en œuvre,” in Frans A. M. Alting von Gesau, ed., Uncertain Détente (Alphen ann den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 57–73; on CBMs, Ken Booth, “War, Security, and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace,” in Booth, ed., New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 335–376.
[Note 6]. The most significant early work on cooperative security includes: John D. Steinbruner, “The Prospect of Cooperative Security,” Brookings Review 7 (Winter 1988–1989): 53–62; Ashton D. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992); also compare “Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement,” Defense Issues 10, no. 26 (March 1995), which is an Executive Summary of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States
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of America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1995). On tit-for-tat, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1985); on GRIT, see Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962).
[Note 7]. On shared context, see the “constructivist” school, e.g., Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (spring 1992): 391–425. On sociological network analysis and dyads vs. triads, see: Ronald L. Breiger, Explorations in Structural Analysis: Dual and Multiple Networks of Social Structure (New York: Garland Press, 1991); Phillippa E. Pattison, Algebraic Models for Social Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[Note 8]. Alexander George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969): 190–222; Philip Tetlock, “Monitoring the Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Policy Rhetoric: What Can Be Learned?” Journal of Social Issues 44, no. 2 (1988): 101–31.
[Note 9]. First mentioned in Robert Cutler, “Towards Cooperative Energy Security in the South Caucasus,” Caucasian Regional Studies 1, no. 1 (1996), pp. 71–81. The more widely print-circulated Russian translation was published [in Tbilisi] as Robert Katler [Cutler], “O sovmestnoi energeticheskoi bezopasnosti v Iuzhnom Kavkaze,” Kavkazskie regional′nye issledovaniia 1, no. 1 (1996), pp. 69–80.
[Note 10]. International Monetary Fund, Financial Relations among Countries of the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1994).
[Note 11]. Good recent examples are Konrad von Moltke, “Institutional Interactions: The Structure of Regimes for Trade and the Environment,” in Oran Young, ed., Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 247–272; and Young, “Global Governance: Toward a Theory of Decentralized World Order,” in ibid., pp. 273–299.
[Note 12]. Robert M. Cutler, “A Strategy for Cooperative Energy Security in the Caucasus,” Caspian Crossroads 3, no. 1 (summer 1997): 23–29. For information on the origin and development of the EAOGA initiative, see “[The Idea of a EurAsian Oil and Gas Association]”.
[Note 13]. Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas, “Improving the Efffeciveness of International Environmental Institutions,” in Haas, Keohane, and Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 397–426.
[Note 14]. See, e.g., Robert V. Barylski, “The Russian Federation and Eurasia’s Islamic Crescent,” Europe-Asia Studies 46 (May–June 1994): 389–416.
[Note 15]. Graham E. Fuller, Central Asia: The New Geopolitics, Report R–4219–USDP (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1992). On Iran’s role in the region at the time, see, e.g.: R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South,” Middle East Journal 46 (Summer 1992): 393–412; T.W. Karasik, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Future Persian Gulf Security, Note N–3579–AF/A (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1993). Dietrich Reetz, “Pakistan and the Central Asian Hinterland Option: The Race for Regional Security and Development,”
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Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 17 (Fall 1993): 28–56, treats a neglected subject.
[Note 16]. On Turkey, Central Asia, and OBSEC, see, for example, Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation,” in Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 37–98, esp. 66–76. Typical of the Turkey/Iran emphasis of the time are: Paul-Marie de la Gorce, “L’avenir des anciennes républiques musulmanes de l’URSS: la modernité d’Ankara contre le pétrole de Téhéran,” Jeune Afrique, 5–11 March 1992, pp. 5–11; Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, “Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors,” Foreign Affairs 72 (January–February 1993): 124–141; and Oles M. Smolansky, “Turkish and Iranian Policies in Central Asia,” in Hafeez Malik, ed., Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), chap. 15.
[Note 17]. On Turkmenistani gas through Iran, see Ahmed Rashid, “Central Asia: Linking Up for Trade,” Far Eastern Economic Review 156, no. 8 (25 February 1993): 19–20. On ECO in general: Paul Thomas, “Geopolitics around the Caspian,” Energy Economist, no. 142 (August 1993): 16–21.
[Note 18]. Yeltsin quoted in Philippa Fletcher, “CIS Heads Slam Yeltsin for Group’s Failings”, Reuters, Chisinau, 23 October 1997; and widely reported elsewhere.
[Note 23]. For details, see Thomas Goltz, “Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand,” Foreign Policy, no. 92 (Fall 1993): 92–116.
[Note 20]. “Azerbaijan Oil Setback,” East European Markets 13, no. 14 (9 July 1993): 3; Ercan Ersoy, “Azerbaijan and Turkey Discuss Oil Pipeline Deal,” Reuters, Ankara, 8 March 1993; Ersoy, “Turkey Says Talks on Azeri Oil Pipeline Postponed,” Reuters Ankara, 28 June 1993; Vladislav Shorokhov, “Energoresursy Azerbaidzhana: Politicheskaia stabil′nost′ i regional′nye otnosheniia,” Kavkazskie regional′nye issledovaniia (Tbilisi), no. 1 (1996): 37–68 (English translation at ⟨http://www.vub.ac.be/POLI/publi/crs/0101–04.htm⟩, accessed 30 November 1998); “Storm in the Caspian?”, Energy Economist, no. 141 (July 1993): 3–6.
[Note 21]. Peter Galuszka, “Exxon of the Steppes?”, Business Week, Industrial/Technology Edition, no. 3362 (14 March 1994): 78E; Ayse Sarioglu, “Turkey Signals Support for Azerbaijan’s Aliyev,” Reuters, Ankara, 1 October 1993; “Moscow’s Fight with Baku,” East European Markets 14, no. 21 (14 October 1994): 11.
[Note 22]. Turan Press Agency (unsigned editorial), “How Many Dollars Will Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan Cost If Azerbaijani Oil Is Shipped Through Novorossiysk?”, Turan, Baku, 2 May 1994.
[Note 23]. On the Aliev-Demirel discussions and Russia’s interest in cooperating, see several Interfax dispatches (various cities) dated 2 November 1994, collated and reported by Elizabeth Fuller, “Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Oil,” RFE/RL Daily Report, (3 November 1994). On Caspian Pipeline Consortium: “Kazakh-Russian-Oman Protocol Signed,” Ukrainian Oil and Gas Herald (Kyiv), 23 January 1995; Brian Killen, “For Oil Exports, Chechnya May Be Azeris’ Problem,” Reuters, Moscow), 3 February 1995; and many other contemporary reports.
[Note 24]. On U.S. support for Ceyhan, see Ayse Sarioglu, “Turkey Says U.S. for Caspian Oil Route via Turkey,” Reuters, Ankara, 31 January 1995. Chernishev quoted: “[Let Us Share the Petroleum],” Cumhurriyet (Ankara), 13 February 1995. On Iranian participation: Raymond Bonner, “Getting This Oil Takes Drilling and Diplomacy,” New York Times, 15 February 1995, pp. D1–D2; “U.S. Requires Azeri Consortium to Opt for Other Passway except Iran [sic],” IRNA (Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency), Ardebil, 14 February 1995.
[Note 25]. “U.K. to Increase Presence in Caucasus, Central Asia,” IRNA, London, 16 February 1995.
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[Note 26]. On U.S. pressure, see: “Kazakhstan May Reject Chevron,” East European Markets, vol. 13, no. 4 (19 February 1993): 8–9. On deal almost cancelled, see Rose Bradu and Peter Galuszka, “The Scramble for Oil’s Last Frontier,” Business Week, Industrial/Technology Edition, no. 3300 (11 January 1993): 42–44. In late 1998, it looks like the CPC project has finally developed critical momentum.
[Note 27]. Elizabeth Fuller, “Caucasus: Interests Converge among the Members of The GUAM States,” RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 December 1997.
[Note 28]. Stephen Blank, “Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus.” Helsinki Monitor 6, no. 3 (1995), on-line edition ⟨http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_monit/hel95_3/blank.htm⟩, accessed 30 November 1998; Jakov Pappe, “Russian Economic Elites: A Group Portrait,” in Klaus Segbers and Stephan De Spiegeleire, eds., Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), vol. 1, Against the Background of the FSU (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), chap. 4.
[Note 29].29. For example, Sue Conning, “‘Be Willing To Improvise’,” Systems 3X/400, 21, no. 12 (December 1993): 50–54.
[Note 30]. Craig Mellow, “Big Oil’s Pipe Dream,” Fortune, 2 March 1998, on-line edition ⟨http://pathfinder.com/fortune/1998/980302/che.html⟩, accessed 30 November 1998; Sushma Ramachandran (New Delhi), “Doubts Over Oman, Iran Gas Projects,” The Hindu (New Delhi), 5 February 1996, p. 1, on-line edition ⟨http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1996/02/05/THF01.html⟩, accessed 30 November 1998.
[Note 31]. Terminology from Samuel P. Huntington, “Transnational Organization in World Politics,” World Politics, 25 (April 1973): 333–368.
[Note 32]. Martin O. Heisler and Robert B. Kvavik, “Patterns of European Politics: The ‘European Polity’ Model,” in Heisler, ed., Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies (New York: David McKay, 1974), chap. 2.
[Note 33]. See, for example, the examination of misuse of human and financial resources related to petroleum development in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Libya in Erjan Kurbanov and Barri Sanders, Caspian Sea Oil Riches: A Mixed Blessing, Occasional Paper (College Park: University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, February 1998).
[Note 34]. Levy, Keohane, and Haas, “Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions.”
[Note 35]. For the idea, see Cutler, “A Strategy for Cooperative Energy Security in the Caucasus,” p. 25. A series of three large, widely-reported, high-level multilateral meetings including major OECD countries and international financial institutions and organizations were held during 1992 in January (Washington), May (Lisbon), and October (Tokyo). See, for example, Barbara Wanner, “Tokyo Joins Washington In Pledging Humanitarian Aid To Ex-Soviet Republics,” Japan Economic Institute Report, no. 42B (6 November 1992); also Steven Weber, “Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,” International Organization 48 (Winter 1994): 1–38.
[Note 36]. In accordance with Article 44, par. (1), of the treaty, the ECT entered formally into force on 16 April 1998. See Peter Schutterle (secretary-general of the Energy Charter secretariat), “The Energy Charter Treaty: Towards an Open Energy Market (interview),” Black Sea Regional Energy Centre Newsletter (Sofia), March 1998, pp. 2–3; “Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Government of Portugal,” on-line at ⟨http://min-nestraingeiros.pt/politica/multilateral/treaty.html⟩, accessed 30 November 1998.
[Note 37]. The best brief overview available of the history, goals, and means of the ECT is Bruce Barnard, “European Energy Charter: Swapping Technology for Oil,”
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Europe, no. 341 (November 1994): 20–21; Robert DeBauw, “Government Promotion of Markets: The European Energy Charter,” Energy Policy, 20 (May 1992): 430–432, is also good.
[Note 38]. Compare Anand G. Chandavarkar, “Developmental Role of Central Banks: Beyond Their Regulatory and Monetary Policy Functions, Central Banks Can Foster Financial Innovation and Development,” Finance and Development 24, no. 12 (December 1987), pp. 34–37.
[Note 38]. David M. Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 38 (June 1994): 193–218; Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell and Randi Ryterman, “End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 2 (1997): 105–133; Michael Webb, “International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Policy Adjustments,” International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991): 309–342.
[Note 40]. On Russia’s motives and attitudes, see Robert M. Cutler, “Russia’s Dilemma in the Caucasus: Power Politics vs. Energy Cooperation,” Analysis of Current Events 10, no. 2 (February 1998): 10–11; this is an abridged and edited translation of Robert M. Katler [Cutler], “Moskva riskuet okazat′sia izolirovannoi ot Kavkaza,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 January 1998, p. 7.
[Note 41]. Eduard Bos, My T. Wu, Ernest Massiah, and Rodolfo A. Bulatao, World Population Projections, 1994–95 Edition: Estimates and Projections with Related Demographic Statistics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1994).
[Note 42]. For sustainable development, see “U.N. Sustainable Development Website” on-line at ⟨http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/⟩, especially ⟨http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/energy.htm⟩, accessed 30 November 1998. On integrating energy and environmental agendas, see: Douglas W. Blum, “The Russian Trade-Off: Environment and Development in the Caspian Sea,” Journal of Environment and Development, 7 (September 1998): 248–277; T. A. Siddiqi, “India-Pakistan Cooperation on Energy and Environment: To Enhance Security,” Asian Survey 35 (1995): 280–90; Robert M. Solow, “Sustainability: An Economist’s Perspective,” in Robert Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman, eds., Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings, 3d ed. (New York: Norton, 1993), pp. 179–87; Peter J. Stoett, “Global Environmental Security, Energy Resources, and Planning,” Futures, 26 (1994): 741–58.
[Note 43]. For a concise evaluation of the ECSC experience, see Clive Archer, Organizing Europe: The Institutions of Integration, 2d ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 73–84. For reflections on the nature of institutions, see Anthony J.N. Judge, “International Institutions: Diversity, Borderline Cases, Functional Substitutes and Possible Alternatives,” in Paul Taylor and A.J.M. Groom, eds., International Organizations: A Conceptual Approach (London: Frances Pinter, 1977). The need to include groups from international civil society is clear from recent developments in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotiations: see, for example, Guy de Jonquieres, “Network Guerrillas: How the Growing Power of Lobby Groups and Their Use of the Internet Is Changing the Nature of International Economic Negotiations,” Financial Times, 30 April 1998; see also Thomas Princen, Matthias Finger and Jack Munro, “Nongovernmental Organizations in World Environmental Politics.” International Environmental Affairs 7, no. 1 (1995): 42–58.
Dr. Robert M. Cutler [ website — email ] was educated at MIT and The University of Michigan, where he earned a Ph.D. in Political Science, and has specialized and consulted in the international affairs of Europe, Russia, and Eurasia since the late 1970s. He has held research and teaching positions at major universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia, and contributed to leading policy reviews and academic journals as well as the print and electronic mass media in three languages.
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